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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the supply risk of rare earths and
its impact on low carbon technologies deployment. Bringing together seem-
ingly disconnected strands of scientific literature, this multidisciplinary ap-
proach allows to provide an overarching overview of the economics of rare
earths. In terms of supply risk, as opposed to the common belief, it is not
China’s dominant position per se, but its industrial policies which distort
the rare earths market. On the demand side, the results of this paper dis-
prove the widespread allegation that availability risk impedes deployment
of offshore wind. Contrary to this, a potential supply shortage of rare earths
would disrupt the further development of the automotive industry and its
electrification. Ultimately, uncertainty about volatile prices and threat of
supply shortages induce manufacturers to shift away from technologies con-
taining rare earths, and thus render innovation in these economically non-
viable.
JEL classification: L11, L72, O31, Q31, Q34, Q37, Q42, Q53
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1 Introduction
Within the past couple of years, growing concerns over massively skewed world
production and supply of rare earths have emerged in the specific context of
clean energy technologies. This paper analyses the extent to which the risk of
supply disruption constitutes a threat to the deployment of these technologies
and how it induces their innovation.
Rare earths constitute a group of 17 chemical elements. As opposed to what the
name suggests, they are neither rare nor earths. In fact, they are fairly abundant
metals, though it is rather unusual to find them in large enough concentrations
to make their mining and processing economically viable and environmentally
friendly. According to Humphries (2010), almost 97% of global rare earths sup-
plies and 50% of world reserves are owned by China. In line with this, it is often
claimed that their geographical concentration poses a potential threat for their
future supply. The latter is further exacerbated by China’s active industrial
policies in form of export quotas, strategic pricing, as well as ongoing consol-
idation of the industry. As a response to these fears, projects outside China
have been recently taking off: resumption of operations by Molycorp in the US,
establishment of Lynas in Australia, as well as refurbishment of a previously pro-
ducing mine by Great Western Minerals Group in South Africa, just to mention
the major ones. However, due to the lengthy period required for their develop-
ment, substantial financial burden and lack of capabilities in terms of technically
trained personnel it becomes clear that these production sites are in no shape to
become significant competitors to China any time soon.
For what concerns the demand side, the growing deployment of low carbon
technologies is expected to remain its main driver. In fact, increasing power
generation capacity, along with decarbonising transport, are laid down by in-
ternational institutions such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Strategic
Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan). Moreover, UNCTAD encourages deploy-
ment of these technologies, claiming that they help eradicating energy poverty
and contribute to the industrialisation effort by developing countries (Sampath
et al., 2011). Further to this, estimates confirm that demand for dysprosium and
neodymium, known for their exceptional magnetic properties which make them
suitable for the lightweight motors and batteries used in low carbon technologies,
is to increase by more than 2600% and 700% respectively, over the coming 25
years (Alonso et al., 2012a). Consequently, shortages of some of the rare earths
are projected to occur already in 2015 (Bourzac, 2011).
On balance, low carbon technologies are intended to tackle climatic changes but
their deployment seems to be adversely affected by resource scarcity. The ques-
tion arises then, to what extent do potential supply shortages of rare earths pose
barriers to low carbon technologies deployment. A lot of specialised literature
exists on different aspects of rare earths, ranging from geology, chemistry and
2
materials science to engineering and life cycle analysis. However, there seems
to be a lack of comprehensive analysis in economic literature. Thus, the aim of
the present paper is to bring these seemingly disconnected strands of literature
together, in order to provide an overarching overview of the rare earths eco-
nomics and to shed clarity on the far reaching consequences of demand-supply
imbalances on innovation of low carbon technologies.
The multidisciplinary approach allows to provide a thorough overview of market
forces in place, investigating the impact of China’s industrial policies on the rare
earths market on the one hand, and the key trends in offshore wind turbines
and advanced technology vehicles, as the main drivers of increased demand for
rare earths on the other. Following from this, conclusions can be drawn on price
and sourcing volatilities inducing manufacturers to innovate or substitute across
technologies. For this purpose, specialised literature from across various fields
of rare earths is analysed. Data on production, supply and industrial uses is
collected in order to determine the existence of supply risk. Subsequently, a
database is created for offshore wind turbines and advanced technology vehi-
cles, collecting information on current technology designs, capacities and global
shares. Based on the information on rare earths intensity of respective topolo-
gies, the cumulative shares in rare earths consumption are determined. Finally,
costs of rare earths within these technologies are estimated.
In order to be able to carry out this analysis, it is important to first understand
the individual rare earth elements and their respective chemical properties and
physical attributes. These, along with the multitude of their uses are reviewed in
Section 2. Section 3 analyses forces on the supply side of the rare earths market
in terms of both geopolitical and quantity risks. Here, also downstream responses
to the threat of supply disruption are discussed, while upstream initiatives such
as recycling, stockpiling, and materials and technology substitution are reviewed
in Section 5. Section 4 discusses the role of rare earths in offshore wind turbines
and advanced technology vehicles. Demand and supply are brought together
in Section 6, where price trends and their impact on technologies’ producers
are considered. After a brief overview of social costs incurred by mining and
processing of rare earths in Section 7, the paper concludes with Section 8.
2 Rare Earths
As per the definition of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
(IUPAC), rare earth elements are lanthanoids with atomic numbers 57 to 71,
as well as yttrium and scandium which exhibit sufficiently similar properties
to be included in this group of transition metals distinguished by their spe-
cial electron configurations (Connelly, 2005). Classified according to their ionic
radii, rare earths constitute two subgroups: light (LREE) and heavy rare earths
(HREE), with scandium not belonging to any of these two (see Table 1). An
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additional group of the medium rare earths (MREE) has emerged recently to de-
note samarium, europium and gadolinium (Hatch, 2011c). Other classifications
may be considered based on physical, chemical, technological and geochemical
attributes, as well as on industrial demand and prices of individual elements.
2.1 From Discovery to Processing
The history of rare earths dates back to 1787, when ytterbite ore was accidentally
discovered by Lieutenant C. A. Arrhenius at Ytterby, Sweden. However, due to
the chemical similarity of rare earths, it took another 7 years until J. Gadolin
successfully isolated a previously undescribed “earth” from the ore. In the com-
ing years, number of mineralogists, geochemists and crystallographers worked on
the separation of metallic oxides present in yttria and ceria, both regarded orig-
inally as pure oxides. It was not until more than a century later that progress
in fractional separation, publication of periodic law of chemical elements and
experimental work on relationship of x-ray spectra to atomic numbers, allowed
to establish the final number of “newly discovered elements” with the complex
mixture of oxides (Gschneidner and Capellen, 1987; Moeller, 1963; Weeks, 1956).
The latter were decomposed into simple oxides of the following rare earths met-
als: yttria was broken down into yttrium, terbium, erbium, ytterbium, lutetium,
holmium, thulium and dysprosium; while ceria was decomposed into cerium,
lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, gadolinium, europium and
promethium.
The multitude of investigators, who often managed to isolate same elements in-
dependently from each other, resulted in a confusion of names throughout the
history. The final version of universally accepted names were mostly derived
from Greek - so is for example the meaning of dysprosium “the difficult to ac-
cess” - while some others were given in honour of scientists who investigated
upon them - gadolinium named after Gadolin - or by geographical location -
lutetium for the ancient name of Paris, the birthplace of one of the investigators
- as well as inspired by astronomy - cerium after planetoid Ceres - and mythol-
ogy - prometheum (whose spelling was later amended to promethium), from
Prometheus - (Gschneidner and Capellen, 1987; Moeller, 1963; Weeks, 1956).
The name of the group of elements instead, is considered a historical misnomer
which arose from rare earths having been first obtained in form of oxides (a
modern term for earths) from seemingly rare minerals. Some of the alterna-
tive names for this transition group are: lanthanides (derived from lanthanum
- the first rare earth element in series), lanthanide elements, lanthanons, or f-
type transition elements to denote their ground-state electronic configurations
of atoms. It is precisely their electronic configurations, large atomic radii and
their position within the periodic table what ranks them among metals rather
than earths (Moeller, 1963).
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In terms of their rarities, individual elements are found in Earth’s crust in differ-
ent quantities. According to the Oddo-Harkins effect, even-numbered elements
are more abundant than the adjacent odd-numbered elements, resulting from
the formers’ lower neutron-capture cross sections preventing them to take up an
additional neutron and thus be transformed to a higher element (Cornell, 1993).
So is cerium and lanthanum constituting the bulk, while lutetium on the other
end of the series has low concentrations within the group. Furthermore, lighter
elements prove to be more abundant than heavier ones, as a consequence of their
different synthesis by atomic fusions in the cores of stars, with heavy elements
being made under higher temperatures and pressures in supernovae only (Cot-
ton, 2007). Table 1 collects figures from various studies on rare earths elements’
continental crust abundance in percentage of parts per million in mass (ppm).
Note that these differ in absolute terms in function of the method of estimation
used and assumptions made about the genesis of the lower crust. Nevertheless,
the order of magnitude is roughly identical across estimations, confirming that
rare earths in the upper part of the table are more abundant, and that those
with odd atomic numbers are less common than those with even atomic num-
bers. Moreover, based on crustal abundance data for most common chemical
elements by Moeller (1963); Taylor (1964); Wedepohl (1995), rare earths prove
to be not less abundant than other common elements. In fact, cerium - the most
abundant rare earth - is in the same range as nickel and zinc and more common
than copper. At the same time the least abundant lutetium and thulium are
more than 100 times more abundant than gold.
While conclusion can be drawn on the relative abundance of rare earths when
compared to other industrial metals, one needs to keep in mind that rare earths
are rarely concentrated in minable deposits. They are obtained from lanthanide
minerals in form of oxides (REO), which contain a mixture of all rare earths ele-
ments (with the exception of promethium). Principal sources of the cerium group
are bastna¨site, monazite and cerianite, while the yttrium group is most com-
monly retrieved from euxenite, xenotime and gadolinite (Cotton, 2007; Moeller,
1963). Despite them being contained in as many as 200 minerals (Walters and
Lusty, 2011), not all of them can be commercially processed due to cost, geo-
graphical location as well as the nature of minerals themselves (Moeller, 1963).
A selection of those that do, along with their REO content, is reported by
Castor and Hedrick (2006). Similarly, an overview of primary and secondary de-
posits and their capacities can be found in Walters and Lusty (2011); Castor and
Hedrick (2006); Long et al. (2010). It is important to note how the significance
of these minerals has changed over time for rare earths mining. Monazite which
occurs in granitic rocks, used to be the most important source of LREE until it
has been lately shifted away from due to its content of radioactive thorium (Cor-
nell, 1993) (USGS, 2013). The same holds for xenotime in placer accumulations
of Australia and Malaysia. Contrary to this, bastna¨site mined from carbonatite
deposits contains negligible amount of thorium and is currently the most impor-
tant deposit of rare earths on western hemisphere - in Mountain Pass, California.
At the same time Chinese ionic clays, namely the iron deposits of Bayan Obo,
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Table 1: Abundance of Rare Earths in Continental Crust, ppm (10’000 ppm = 1%)
Z* Element Symbol (1) (2) (3) (4)
LREE - The Cerium Group
57 Lanthanum La 30 29 30 35
58 Cerium Ce 60 70 60 66
59 Praseodymium Pr 8.2 9.0 6.7 9.1
60 Neodymium Nd 28 37 27 40
61 Promethium† Pm - - NA 0.0
62 Samarium Sm 6.0 8.0 5.3 7.0
63 Europium Eu 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.1
64 Gadolinium Gd 5.4 8.0 4.0 6.1
HREE - The Yttrium Group
39 Yttrium Y 33 29 24 31
65 Terbium Tb 0.9 2.5 0.65 1.2
66 Dysprosium Dy 3.0 5.0 3.8 4.5
67 Holmium Ho 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.3
68 Erbium Er 2.8 3.3 2.1 3.5
70 Ytterbium Yb 3.0 0.33 2.0 3.1
69 Thulium Tm 0.48 0.27 0.3 0.5
71 Lutetium Lu 0.50 0.8 0.35 0.8
21 Scandium Sc 22 NA 16 NA
*Atomic number; †Promethium has no stable isotopes and is not found in nature.
Source: Data complied from (1) Taylor (1964), (2) Jackson and Christiansen (1993), (3) Wedepohl
(1995), (4) Cotton (2007).
have become the largest source of rare earths in the world. Only a few of the
mines are operated for the recovery of rare earths themselves, the latter being
mostly retrieved as by-products or joint-products of iron ore (China), titanium
(Russia), uranium (Canada), zirconium and niobium (some mines in Australia),
or thorium (Brazil) (Walters and Lusty, 2011). This implies that their mining
decisions are driven primarily by the demand for principal products, rather than
by the actual demand for rare earths.
As a consequence of the diversity of rare earths deposits, both extraction tech-
niques and physical and chemical processing techniques depend on the miner-
alogy and chemical composition of deposits. The extraction techniques vary
from more economic and currently most practised surface mining, through un-
derground mining, to in-situ mining suitable for near-surface deposit of softer
ion absorption clays. The complexity of processing methods also influences the
competitive advantage of deposits, processing of ion absorption clays being more
cost efficient than that of hard-rock deposits, for example. Similarly, HREE are
often more complex to process than minerals containing LREE. In general, tech-
niques for processing multiple mineral phases prove to be more complex and
costly to carry out than for many industrial metals concentrated in a single
mineral phase. An outline of these can be found in Walters and Lusty (2011);
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Castor and Hedrick (2006); Cotton (2007); Moeller (1963); Long et al. (2010).
The result are high purity compounds, with different purities used for different
applications, ranging from mischmetal in alloy metallurgy to rare earth metals
with purities of up to 99.9999% required in magnetic applications (Cotton, 2007;
Walters and Lusty, 2011).
2.2 Their Industrial Use
The commercial production of rare earths’ compounds started after the WWII,
with the availability of improved separation techniques, such as ion-exchange,
partition and liquid-liquid extraction (Gschneidner and Capellen, 1987). This
turned the former minor metals into metals of large industrial uses. Rare earths
have been sold in various forms, from mineral concentrates, mixed chemicals,
oxides and metals, to magnets, phosphors and powders, in line with the devel-
opments in their end uses overtime (Walters and Lusty, 2011). According to
the estimates reported by Henderson (1984), in 1980 more than one third of the
production by volume was used in form of mischmetal in metallurgic applica-
tions. Catalytic applications for fluid cracking catalysts (FCCs) in petroleum
refining and in polyesterification processes constituted another third. By 2010
these have significantly lost on importance by dropping to 18% and 20% by
volume, respectively (Kingsnorth, 2011). The usage for glass-polishing composi-
tions and as colouring agents in ceramics remained altogether very similar over
time. The recent use of rare earth phosphors seems to be linked to the discov-
ery of their luminescence property, which further allowed for commercialisation
in medical applications (laser, X-ray, MRIs), as well as in electronics (cathode
ray tube television, energy-efficient fluorescent lamps). Being used in all kind
of visual display devices these days, phosphors account for more than 30% of
consumption by value according to Kingsnorth (2009). Furthermore, with per-
fectioning of hydrometallurgical processes for extraction of raw materials and
improved methods for purification of rare earths, increased purities of elements
allowed for their wide application in high-tech products, cell phones, hard disk
drives (HDD), microphones and digital music players. In terms of their volume,
both phosphors and high-techs continue constituting only a negligible part of the
market, though their relative value is high. For illustration, merely a small frac-
tion of a gram is sufficient to guarantee quality sound, high resolution coloured
screen or vibration function in a smartphone, as compared to several hundred
kilograms required for MRIs (Molycorp, 2010; Tasman, 2010). Other uses of
rare earths are in defence applications, such as radars and sonars, as well as in
nuclear energy applications and fertilisers.
Last but not least, despite the fact that the most important physical properties of
rare earths - ferromagnetism and superconductivity - were discovered already in
the 1930s, it was only several decades later that samarium and neodymium based
permanent magnets started to replace conventional aluminium-nickel-cobalt (Al-
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NiCo) magnets. According to Kingsnorth (2009), these constitute nowadays
more than 20% of rare earths by volume and almost 40% by value. Main ap-
plications of rare earth magnets are in clean-energy technologies such as electric
vehicles and direct drive wind turbines. Similarly, in today’s age of miniaturi-
sation of high-tech sector, their superior coercivity and higher energy products
are essential to keep up effectiveness and efficiency of devices while continuously
shrinking their size and weight.
An overview of an unusually wide range of consumer products making use of rare
earths is provided in Table 2, along with the breakdown of particular elements
employed. It becomes obvious that despite their similar chemical properties,
rare earth are applied in different combinations, forms and purities within dif-
ferent technologies. The most extensively used ones are those with lower atomic
numbers. Some of the HREE such as dysprosium, terbium, yttrium are used
in smaller quantities to enhance the properties of the LREE, such as coerciv-
ity and magnetic flux. Holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium and
scandium instead, can be considered as minor metals, the lack of their uses in
mass production being conditioned by the their relative scarcity (Technology
Metals Research, 2010).
Rare earths play a key role in enabling digital technology, improving energy
efficiency, enhancing environmental protection as well as are indispensable for
health and medical technologies. In all these fields, a growing demand is expected
to occur driven by economic growth from emerging economies on the one hand,
and from new technologies under development on the other. Linking the market
demand of individual elements from all these technologies back to the proportions
in which they can be found in deposits, to the accessibility of their geological
locations and to the complexity of their processing, two things become obvious:
first, the demand for the rare earths is not uniform. This implies higher prices
for less abundant oxides contained in minerals the processing of which is more
complex. This is further exacerbated by the fact that rare earths are often mined
as by-product and their production rates depend on the production rates of base
metals. Second, in order to keep up the supply of the most commercialised rare
earths, such as dysprosium and neodymium, an oversupply of some less utilised
oxides such as samarium and yttrium which are contained in ores will necessarily
occur.
8
Table 2: Main Rare Earth Applications.
Field Technology Rare Earths Application La Ce Pr Nd Sm Eu Gd Y Tb Dy Er
Energy Efficiency Lighting Phosphors in Compact Fluorescent Light bulbs
(CFLs)
(x) (x) (x) x (x) x (x)
Clean Water Water Purification Cerium Chloride for Waste water, Recreational
Water
x
Healthcare Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Magnets and Contrasting Agents in MRI Scans x x x (x) (x)
Transportation Hybrid and Electric Vehicles Nickel Metal Hydride (NiMH) battery x (x) (x) (x)
Magnets in Electric Motors x x (x) (x)
Hybrid Vehicles Braking x x (x) (x)
Others Auto Catalysts (x) x (x)
Polish for Glass, Mirrors and UV Cut Glass x x
Magnets Used in Small Motors to Power Win-
dows, Seats, Sunroofs ...etc.
x x (x) (x)
Component Sensors x
Phosphors in LCD Screens x x x
Clean Energy Wind Turbines Permanent Magnet Generators x x (x) (x)
National Defence Satellite Systems, Small Motors Magnets and Phosphors to Aid Satellite Posi-
tioning, Communication Transmission and Re-
ception, Small Motors for Guided Missiles
x x x x x (x) (x)
LCD screens for Computers, Night
Vision Goggles, and Laser Technol-
ogy
Phosphors x x x
Oil Industry Fluid Cracking Catalysts (FCC) Stabilisator of Structure and Chemistry of Zeo-
lites Used as a Molecular Filter
x (x) (x) (x)
Mobile Devices Laptops, Tablets, Mobile Phones,
iPods
Magnets in Speakers (within Ear-
phones/Headphones)
x x (x) (x)
Magnets in Vibration Function x x (x) (x)
Phosphor Coating for Cathode Ray Tubes
(CRT), Plasma (PDP) and Computer Monitors
(x) (x) (x) x (x) x x (x)
Polishing Powders for Cathode Ray Tubes
(CRT), Plasma (PDP) and Liquid Crystal Dis-
play (LCD) Glass
x x x
Computing Computer Hard Disk Drives (HDD),
CD-ROMs and DVDs
Magnets x x (x) (x)
High Strength Glass Substrates x x (x) (x) (x) (x)
Other Advanced Communica-
tion Technologies
Fibre Optics Cables Doping Agents x x x x
Note: x = main rare earths, (x) = may be added in smaller quantities
Source: Information compiled from Lynas, 2010; Molycorp, 2010; Tasman, 2010.
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2.3 The Criticality of “Not So Rare” Metals
The multitude of their uses in green technologies, consumer goods and military
applications ranks rare earths among strategically important raw materials. The
terms strategic and critical are often used interchangeably for raw materials, how-
ever it is advisable to distinguish between them: strategic denoting military uses
while critical meaning availability risk to national economy stemming from in-
ternational supply. According to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling
Revision Act of 1979, strategic and critical materials are those which a) “would
be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs [of the
United States] during a national emergency, and b) are not found or produced
[in the United States] in sufficient quantities to meet such need” (United States
Public Laws, 1979). The first part of this definition points to the dependence
on raw materials of growing economic importance. The second part is about the
availability risk. According to the material science literature, the two main mech-
anisms behind material availability risk are physical constraint and institutional
inefficiency. The former is a well researched concept which concerns physical
scarcity from long term perspective. It has been derived from Malthusian and
Ricardian considerations of physical constraints on resource availability in terms
of physical exhaustion and of quality of supply (Alonso et al., 2007). The con-
cept of institutional inefficiency instead, has not been given enough emphasis
within resource and environmental economics due to its short-term nature. It
arises from local trigger by markets’, firms’ and governments’ failures, which may
cause supply disruptions globally and result in permanent changes to the supply
chain or to materials used therein (Alonso et al., 2007). Authors consider con-
centration within supply chain as the most important measure of institutional
inefficiency, in terms of both geographic structure of supply and production and
of institutional structure based on production and consumption.
For what concerns the particular case of rare earths, based on the preceding
discussion on abundance, as well as taking into consideration that the static
depletion index for REO based on reserves is 1219 years (as compared to 38
years for copper)1, physical constraint does not seem to be an issue. From an
institutional inefficiency viewpoint, looking at the geographical distribution one
cannot speak of concentration of rare earths reserves either (see Figure 3). Nev-
ertheless, not all exploitable deposits are currently economically viable, located
in reliable geopolitical jurisdictions with sound processing in place (Berry, 2013).
The more pressing issue proves to be the geographic and institutional structure
of production, in terms of concentration of primary production and of control.
The fact that China is the single major producer of rare earths (see Figure 4)
exercising control over the global market, might lead to a serious global supply
disruption should a political disturbance occur on the local level.
1Own calculations based on 2013 estimates published by U.S. Department of Interior - U.S.
Geological Survey (2014).
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The high threat of supply risk of rare earths has now been confirmed by the EU
Raw Materials Initiative (EC, 2010) which ranked rare earths as a group highest
in terms of supply risk and environmental country risk, due to concentration of
supply in China and the EU’s 100% dependence on imports. Similarly, Bauer
et al. (2010, 2011) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy conclude on short
and medium term criticality of 5 rare earths - dysprosium, terbium, europium,
neodymium and yttrium - based on their importance to clean energy and supply
risk. Furthermore, a study by Moss et al. (2011) within the framework of EU’s
Strategic Energy Technology Plan (Set-Plan) confirms the high risk position of
dysprosium and neodymium both in terms expected demand growth from green
technologies and in terms of short term limitations to expanding the supply.
These are further exacerbated by high concentration of production and political
risk of the supplier country. Finally, the Japanese Scheme for Critical Raw
Materials acknowledges the tight supply of rare metals caused by both rapid
increase in their consumption as well as by supplier countries’ export policies.
However, in addition to the political risk and concentration, the report envisages
long term physical constraint in terms of depletion of land-based resources of
dysprosium in the coming decades (Kawamoto, 2008).
To conclude with, based on both theory and results of studies, rare earths are
considered highly vulnerable to institutional inefficiencies. The threat of supply
risk arises from the political risk and concentration of supply. In line with
this, the next section analyses supply risk of rare earths offering a geopolitical
perspective and discusses the Chinese hegemony in terms of quantity risk in
depth.
3 Supply Risk
The major cause of global supply chain disruptions besides natural catastrophes
and factory disasters is the geopolitical risk when sourcing raw materials from
remote regions characterised by lack of political stability (Advisen Ltd, 2013).
The latter includes events such as labour disputes (e.g. case of platinum (Chong,
2013)), civil wars and political upheavals (e.g. Zaire in 1978 (Alonso et al., 2007))
international terrorism (e.g. government’s response to 9/11 (Sheffi, 2001)), as
well as other dynamics impacting the long term stability of the region. What
these events have in common is the local character with global ramifications on
the entire supply chain. The 1977 - 1979 “cobalt crunch” is an example of a local
event which permanently changed materials, technologies, and sourcing routes
within the global cobalt supply chain. Cobalt being a primary input to aerospace
and defence industries was considered strategic to the US - its major importer.
Political unrest in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), coupled with
tight cobalt supplies and increased demand from industrial economies resulted
in a temporary disruption of cobalt supply and a price increase by 330%. These
developments triggered both upstream and downstream responses across the
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supply chain, such as extending production capacities to Zambia, recycling and
substitution (Alonso et al., 2007; Shedd, 1999). For example, in samarium-cobalt
(SmCo) permanent magnets for electrical equipment, cobalt was substituted by
cobalt-free permanent magnets based on neodymium and iron compound which
were developed in 1983.2 On the one hand, this substitution resulted in a superior
magnet technology and reduction of vulnerability to volatile cobalt prices and
to resource dependence on Zaire (Gschneidner and Capellen, 1987). On the
other hand though, it indirectly shifted the world dependence from politically
unstable Zaire to communist China. In fact, neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB)
magnets deployment has been driving the demand for some of the rare earths,
the majority supplier of which is China.
3.1 Geopolitical Security and Resource Dependence
Besides the present increased demand of rare earths being an indirect conse-
quence of the cobalt supply chain disruption back in the 1970s, there are several
parallels between the two minerals: both are to a large extent by-products, what
makes their supply be largely inelastic; the production of cobalt then and of rare
earths now is heavily concentrated with 2/3 of world cobalt production origi-
nating from the Copper Belt, while more than 95% of rare earths in 2010 were
mined in China; finally both are labelled as critical and strategic materials. In
addition, similar to the cobalt prices set by producers and sales carried out under
long term contracts before 1990s, also in the case of rare earths there have been
no spot markets with independent traders until recently (Shedd, 1999). Bearing
in mind the far reaching consequences of cobalt supply disruptions, it proves
important to analyse the geopolitics of rare earths.
To start with China, its intention to use rare earths as a tool of foreign policy
was implicitly revealed in 1992 when Deng Xiaoping, leader of the China, stated
out: “There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China” (Hurst, 2010).
The parallels are not only in respective reserves of raw materials, but also in how
the two influence international relations through the control of these. Thinking
back to the Arab Oil embargo in early 1970s, the oil crisis manifested itself by
shortfall of automotive gasoline and dramatic increases in prices of gasoline and
heating fuels. OPEC’s control of oil was serving to achieve political and eco-
nomic goals of oil producing Arab states by exercising pressure on industrialised
oil importing countries. In a similar fashion, though to a lesser extent, China has
used its control of rare earths exercising pressure on resource dependent coun-
tries. In early 2000s China tightened the supply of rare earths by introducing
export quotas and setting limits to number of companies allowed to export (Ting
and Seaman, 2013). Cutting back supply escalated with the 2010 maritime in-
2Note that these magnets still contain up to 5% of cobalt in order to improve the otherwise
low Curie temperatures when compared to SmCo magnets (Cobalt Development Institute,
2006).
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cident between China and Japan, when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with
Japanese coast guard vessels in the waters which are since long object of terri-
torial dispute between the two countries. Consequently, China used its position
as a diplomatic leverage and imposed an “administrative halt” on rare earths
exports to Japan (Bradsher, 2010a). Though there has been little doubt that
this informal act by Chinese customs relates back to the detention of the Chinese
captain by Japanese coast guards (Wong, 2010; Reilly, 2012), some claim that
there is no clear evidence for or against the embargo (Johnston, 2013). Even if
exports resumed within two months time from the incident, China’s diplomatic
assertiveness has significantly impacted both East Asian and international en-
vironment: while Japan’s manufacturing is highly dependent on sourcing rare
earths from China, the world is dependent on importing manufactures from
Japan. The world’s largest economies responded by financing new rare earths
projects outside China, as well as R&D for improved extraction, resource effi-
cient use, recycling and substitutes. The EU-US-JP Trilateral Critical Materials
Initiative is an example of a joint initiative to reduce countries’ resource depen-
dence on China (DOE, 2011; EC, 2013; NEDO, 2012). As per Japan, it is now in
process of exploring seabed deposits, which among other minerals also contain
rare earth ores (Mori, 2013; Evans-Pritchard, 2013). This however is susceptible
to trigger a vicious circle of geopolitical instability in the region. In fact, these
mineral reserves are found in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - another
disputed seabed the waters of which are of overlapping claims to both China and
Japan (Kawamoto, 2008).
To summarize, considering the importance of rare earths in low carbon tech-
nologies as well as in defence appliances, a potential supply disruption threatens
country’s energy and national security. It is thus expected that rare earths
turn into new elements of geopolitical power - a role previously conferred to
oil. However, for the moment China’s rare earth diplomacy has not exercised
strong leverage on import-dependent countries to pursue its own strategic goals
to the extent Arab countries has done during the energy crisis in 1970s. What
is more, China has denied the use of rare earth as a bargaining tool (Huixia,
2010). Nonetheless, geopolitics is not to be underestimated in that it plays a
significant role in determining supply and demand. Also, it is shaped by balance
of power between mineral rich and mineral poor countries (de Ridder, 2013).
It proves thus important to consider the mineral policies of exporting countries
on the one hand and policy responses to concerns about supply disruptions in
importing countries on the other. In this light, China’s industrial policies are
considered next, followed by the downstream responses by importing countries.
The upstream strategies are described in Section 5.
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3.2 Quantity Risk
From the above discussion it becomes obvious that concentration alone does not
constitute an issue to rare earths supply risk. Rather, it is China’s abuse of power
over resources in terms of its protectionist policies. In fact, rare earths were de-
clared as “protected and strategic materials” more than two decades ago (Tse,
2011) and China introduced rare earth industrial policy measures to hold them
back for domestic purposes. Firstly, resource nationalism in China has seen for-
eign companies being banned from engaging in any part of the rare earths supply
chain other than forming joint ventures with domestic companies (MOFCOM,
2012h). Secondly, both domestic and joint venture companies became subjected
to production quotas (MLR, 2013) and export quotas (MOFCOM, 2012a). Con-
sequently, the number of companies permitted to export was gradually decreasing
from 41 in 2007 to 24 only in 2013.3 Thirdly, increased state control on sup-
ply chain was achieved by merging several companies into one “megacompany”
(MOFCOM, 2012d), by banning new rare earth mining licenses (MOFCOM,
2012e) and by eliminating smuggling (MOFCOM, 2012i). Fourthly, creation of
joint pricing platform (MOFCOM, 2012b) and of national pricing system (MOF-
COM, 2012f), accompanied by benevolent production halts (MOFCOM, 2012c)
and decision to set up a stockpile (MOFCOM, 2012g), strengthen China’s pricing
power. Taken together, the protectionist policies demonstrate a clear alignment
of China’s natural resource policies with its national interests. However, this
state interventionism paralysed the usual market forces - supply and demand -
causing resource-dependent countries to lose influence over raw materials, what
ultimately lead to increased geopolitical and economic risks. It is important to
note that not all aspects of supply risk are relevant to all rare earths equally.
The extent depends on the future demand, scarcity as well as complexity of their
processing.
3.2.1 Mined in China
Global import data of rare earths compounds and metals compiled from UN
Statistics Division, 2013 sheds light into the severity of resource dependence
of rare earths importing countries. In 2012, Japan was the largest importer
with 13’829 tonnes, followed by the US with 10’161 tonnes. France and Estonia
imported half as much - 5’520 tonnes and 5’044 tonnes, respectively - tightly
followed by Germany with 4’814 tonnes and Malaysia with 4’332 tonnes of rare
earth products. Not only are these countries import-dependent, they also tend
to source majority of rare earths from China, as illustrated in Figure 1. While
the three major importers - Japan, the EU and to some extent the US - have
already been dependent on China back in 1992, by 2012 the relative proportions
of Chinese exports to Japan and the EU decreased, while to the US they in-
3Considering parent companies.
14
creased substantially. Also, by 2012 additional countries started to source rare
earths from China: Russia, Brazil and Australia which discontinued domestic
production in the 1990s (see Figure 4), as well as South Korea and Hong Kong
which started to manufacture rare earth-intensive technologies.
Figure 1: Comparison of Chinese Export Destinations: a) 1992 and b) 2012.
(a) 1992 (b) 2012
Note: Following Harmonized System codes were taken into consideration: HS280530, HS284610,
HS284690. Source: Based on data collected from UN Comtrade Database (UN Statistics Division,
2013).
Overall, China exported 16’266 tonnes of rare earth products in 2012, 83% of
these as compounds and the rest in form of metals. The other top five global rare
earth exporters were Austria, Japan, Russia and the US. While the latter two
were historically primary producers of rare earths, Austria and Japan import rare
earths and process these further to produce metal alloys and chemical products
for export. Figure 2 shows that since 2000 China has been by far the largest
supplier of rare earths, though its exports have been decreasing gradually ever
since 2003, from almost 10 times more than the second largest supplier in 2000
to below 2.5 times more in 2012.
In order to gain a long term perspective, it proves important to examine the
availability of reserves worldwide. Considering the dynamic nature of reserves,
Figure 3 shows a snapshot for years 1995 and 2013. China’s percentage share of
reserves remained constant overtime at approximately 40%. Note that estimates
vary from 22% to 50% depending on the calculation method used (Humphries,
2010). Though China’s reserves in absolute terms increased overtime by 28%,
there was a drop of 37% when considering the sub-period of rapid exploitation
in 1995-2002. Other substantial deposits can be found in Brazil (16%), the
Commonwealth on Independent States (CIS) (14%) and the US (10%), with the
global share of other countries below 5%. It follows from this, that while China
possesses the largest single deposit of rare earths, there exist substantial deposits
in other parts of the world too. However, the economic viability of reserves in
terms of concentration of ore and ease of processing is not to be neglected. The
surficial clay deposits of Jiangxi (China) are much less complex to mine and
process than the bulk ore from Strange Lake (Canada) or Xenotime in Lahat
(Malaysia) (Long et al., 2010). Another concern is the decreasing quality of
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Figure 2: World Rare Earth Export, by Country, 2000-2012.
Note: Following Harmonized System codes were taken into consideration: HS280530, HS284610,
HS284690. Source: Based on data collected from UN Comtrade Database (UN Statistics Division,
2013).
mined ores which requires more costly and energy intensive extraction (Cho,
2012). Also, there are long lead times for new mines development and higher
environmental standards in Western countries which require more sustainable
mining and processing techniques. Finally, considering the relative distribution
of scarcer HREE-rich minerals, 80% of world’s deposits are contained in Chinese
ion adsorption clays of South-east Guangdong and Jiangxi Provinces (USGS,
2013) (Walters and Lusty, 2011). Instead, LREE can be retrieved in substantial
concentrations from Mountain Pass (the US), Mount Weld (Australia), besides
the Bayan Obo (China) deposit which is the largest of its kind in the world. All
these taken together, guarantee China to remain the rare earth’s super power
beyond the medium term.
In terms of global production trends, various producer countries were leading
the rare earths market historically: while in the first half of the 20th century the
market was dominated by REO mined from Brazilian, Indian and South African
monazite bearing placers, in the second half of the century production shifted
to Mountain Pass bastna¨site deposits in the US. China entered the market in
late 1970s and after a transition period in mid-1980s it became market leader
thanks to cheap labour force, less stringent environmental regulation, but also
well trained technical staff in processing and engineering. Lower prices of Chinese
REO resulted in squeezing the US and most of other producing countries out of
the market by early 2000s (USGS, 2013) (Haxel et al., 2002). Figure 4 illustrates
China’s hegemony in global production of rare earths over the past 20 years.
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Figure 3: Comparison of World Rare Earth Reserves, by Country: a) 1996 and b)
2013.
(a) 1995 (b) 2013
Source: Based on data collected from USGS, 2014.
The data is to be interpreted with caution in that it is based on estimates,
and might be incomplete in terms of minerals and country coverage. It also
does not to account for production from stockpiled material (Walters and Lusty,
2011). During the period examined (1988-2013), China increased its rare earths
production by 237%, while the rest of the world decreased production by 66%.
Taken together the global production increased by 75%, peaking in 2006 with
136’657 tonnes. Taking a closer look at Figure 5 it becomes obvious that as
opposed to the expectations, China’s monopoly has been eroding, its share in
world production having shrank from 98% in 2009 to 89% in 2013. While China
still dominates the market by far, some new players have been entering the
global rare earth market. For the moment, the American Molycorp and the
Australian Lynas, as well as production sites in India and Russia constitute
the competitive fringe. With further increase in their mining capacities and
expected development of new projects outside China, a further erosion in China’s
monopoly is foreseen to occur in medium to long term.
Two things need to be noted when talking about Chinese rare earths produc-
tion. First, the Chinese Government has been setting yearly production quotas,
putting forward the environmental damage. To-date these have always been
exceeded by production companies. For example, the quota set by the China
Ministry of Land and Resources in 2006 was 86’620 (Tse, 2011), the estimated
production exceeding it by 55% at 133’000 tonnes. According to Tse (2011),
the discrepancy between sustained high production levels and quotas can be
explained by competition among local governments which derive substantial fi-
nancial resources from rare earth producers. By 2013, quotas smoothly increased
to 93’800 tonnes (MLR, 2013) with a substantially lower production, exceeding
the former by a 7% only. Quotas limit especially the production of HREE by
allocating only 17’900 tonnes to ionic clays, what is less than 20% of the over-
all production allowed. Second, in an attempt to consolidate the industry and
minimize environmental damage, China has been tightening supply by shutting
down illegal mines. During past years, altogether 110 mines were closed down
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Figure 4: World Mine Production, by Country, 1988-2013.
Source: Based on estimates collected from USGS, 2013; USGS, 2014.
in the South-Eastern provinces (MIIT, 2012; MOFCOM, 2012k). According to
estimates, 22’320 tonnes of rare earths were smuggled out of the country in 2011,
what represents 130% of the legally exported quantity (MOFCOM, 2012j). Most
of the illicit materials are claimed to be transported through Taiwan and Hong
Kong for further processing in Japan and Vietnam (Want China Times, 2010).
The country has also introduced rare earth export quotas, aiming at satisfying
the increasing domestic demand on the one hand and at conserving exhaustible
natural resources in line with the 10th Five-Year Plan on the other (MIIT, 2012).
These became a further source of market distortion globally and triggered the
Figure 5: Comparison of World Mine Production, by Country: a) 2009 and b) 2013.
(a) 2009 (b) 2013
Source: Based on estimates collected from USGS, 2013; USGS, 2014.
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EU, Japan and the US to log a joint complaint to the WTO (2012). Similarly
as in case of Chinese export restraints on bauxite and other industrial materials,
the WTO has recently judged the imposition of export duties and quotas on rare
earths incompatible with its rules, in that they violate free trade in favour of
China’s domestic industry. Nonetheless, China now envisages to appeal against
this decision (Jolly, 2014). In order to conclude on the extent to which export
quotas hamper international trade in reality, Figure 6 offers an overview of pro-
duction, exports and respective quotas during the past 10 years. The collected
data and notes are summarised in Table 8 in Appendix A. Export quotas have
been decreasing ever since 2005 - a reduction by 50% to-date - with the largest
annual drop in 2010 by 37%. Since then, only minimal changes in quotas oc-
curred. However, note that from 2011 also alloys with a much less rare earth
content are counted towards the quota (MOFCOM, 2012l). There is no consen-
sus on how the inclusion of ferro-alloys would impact the quotas, views of experts
diverging from no large impact at all (Hatch, 2011a), through 6% of tightening
(Bradsher, 2010b), till 40% net decline of rare earth metals and oxides exported
(MetalBulletin, 2011). For the moment though this seems to pose no further
constraints on satisfying the demand.
Figure 6: Chinese Rare Earths Production and Exports, and Respective Quotas, in
tonnes, 2000-2013.
Source: Based on data collected from UN Statistics Division, 2013; MOFCOM, 2014; USGS, 2013;
USGS, 2014 and Tse (2011).
Examining export quotas jointly with actually exported quantities of rare earths
sheds light on how the earlier tight supply turned into a surplus in recent years.4
4There seems to be a discrepancy between export quotas as reported by MOFCOM, 2014
and actual exports as collected from UN Statistics Division, 2013. Unfortunately, Chinese
customs data were not available for comparison.
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In fact, while during the initial years of tightening quotas have limited the actual
exports, the majority of quotas remained unfilled in the subsequent years. Chi-
nese exports to rest of the world shrunk by 70% since the 2008 financial crisis.
Due to the weak post-financial crisis global demand but also due to West run-
ning down huge accumulated rare earths stocks during 2010-2011 (Kingsnorth,
2013b), Chinese exports decreased to only a little above the half of the autho-
rised quantities in 2011 and 2012. As of now, there is no trade data available
for 2013, yet some sources anticipate this trend to reverse with recovery of ma-
jor rare-earth importing economies and with depletion of stockpiled material
(Kingsnorth, 2013b; Topf, 2013c). Just like with production quotas, also in case
of export quotas there is a split between LREE and HREE. Since 2012, when
China started to report the quotas separately for the two groups, the HREE are
capped to roughly 12% of the total. According to China’s rare earth development
plan, the country intends to maintain tight supply for some of the critical rare
earths (dysprosium and terbium) in the future as well (Tse, 2011). Lifton (2013)
argues that China itself is about to loose self-sufficiency in some of the HREE
since “they don’t have any more deposits [...] and the other is, they don’t want
to strain what they’ve got”. Hence, China started to look at global deposits to
secure its future sources of supplies. Acquisition of stake in Australian Arafura,
as well as attempted purchase of controlling stakes in both Lynas and Molycorp
are examples of China’s expansion attempts to foreign mining territories. There
are also signs of China’s interest in North Korean rare earths (Schearf, 2014;
Wee, 2014).
In conclusion, the present “abundance” of rare earths in terms of unfilled quotas
is not to be underestimated considering the economic recovery of Japan, the EU
and the US - the major importers of Chinese rare earths. While LREE might
be back in balance in short term due to new non-Chinese suppliers entering the
market, the skewed distribution of HREE-rich deposit reserves in China and
the threat of their depletion, along with tight production and export quotas are
expected to cause substantial supply shortages in the near future, especially for
the elements labelled critical.
3.2.2 Made in China
Economically speaking, the industrial policies discussed above benefit domestic
producers in that they make more supply available at lower prices. This is in
line with China’s resource nationalism, whereby export quotas are set to satisfy
country’s own need of rare earths for manufacturing. For industrial upgrading
in China speaks also the fact that export quotas were only set for REO and for
some metals and alloys but not for products higher in the supply chain.
Looking at the Figure 6, the increasing wedge between production and export
quotas indicates rising domestic consumption of rare earths. Indeed, while the
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Chinese consumption was smooth in the 1990’s, there was a dramatic increase in
the first decade from 19’000 tonnes in 2000 to almost 73’000 tonnes in 2007 - an
increase by some 280% (Zhanheng, 2010). According to estimates by Kingsnorth
(2011) adapted in Figure 7, China was the major consumer of rare earths with
58% of estimated global demand, followed by Japan and the North East Asian
countries with 22%, the US with 12%, 8% of the global demand in the rest of
the world.
Figure 7: Estimated Global Rare Earths Consumption (in tonnes), by Country and
Sector, 2010.
Source: Adapted from (Kingsnorth, 2011).
As can be seen in Figure 8, this increase has been mainly driven by increased
production of magnets and phosphors. According to data for 2010, China man-
ufactured 79% of all magnets, two thirds of alloys, glass and phosphors and
half of the world’s phosphor powders. For what concerns its dominance in mag-
nets, China supplies 80’000 tonnes of NdFeB annually, half of which is used
domestically (Kosich, 2013). In spite of this, China currently holds no patents
on neodymium magnets. These are controlled exclusively by the two inventors:
Magnequench (previously General Motors, currently owned by Molycorp) which
has rights on bonded and hot pressed magnets; and Hitachi (previously Sumit-
omo) with patents on sintered magnets. The latter owns over 615 of them and
as of July 2013 licensed some to 2 companies in Japan, 3 in Europe, and 9 in
China (Benecki, 2013). Concerning the latter, out of 200 Chinese manufacturers
only a quarter holds these licences and can manufacture and sell them world-
wide. Those without licenses have filed a complaint against Hitachi in August
2013 due to the latter extending patent expirations for process patents what in
turn infringes patent rights from Chinese point of view and ultimately hinders
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Chinese magnet exports (Kosich, 2013). The legal dispute is not expected to end
soon, but should the court rule in favour of Chinese producers, this could lead
to concentration of the entire rare-earths-to-permanent-magnets supply chain in
Chinese hands. In fact, China already dominates the supply chain from extrac-
tion, through processing to production of most finished manufactures. Especially
this latter stage shall assure China to achieve economic growth by exporting rare
earths in higher value-added forms, which are worth more than in concentrate
form.
Figure 8: Chinese Rare Earths Consumption (in tonnes), 2001 and 2011.
Source: Adapted from (Kingsnorth, 2011; Hong, 2006).
Chinese efforts to achieve industrial upgrading can be best understood by analysing
its science and technology (S&T) policies. These are drawn up by the Min-
istry of Science and Technology and target long terms objectives of becoming
an innovative nation by 2020 (Mancheri, 2012). The innovation efforts in rare
earths started in the 1980s with the approval of the National High Technol-
ogy Research and Development Program (also labelled as Program 863) which
aimed at narrowing the technology gap between China and the developed world
by leapfrogging those high-tech fields in which China had relative advantages.
Among others, the program focused on rare earths due to their strategic sig-
nificance and geological abundance within the country (Hurst, 2010). It was
followed up on by National Basic Research Program in the 1990s (Program 973)
- a basic research program targeting major strategic needs of the country. Cur-
rently, both fundamental and applied research on rare earths is carried out in
four major laboratories, focusing mainly on rare earth chemistry, physics and
exploration, as well as on environmental protection and on rare earth utilization
in both traditional industry and as new functional materials. Besides this, the
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Chinese Society of Rare Earths publishes the only periodic publications focusing
on rare earths and organises conferences on rare earth development and appli-
cation. In terms of research on various fields of rare earths chemistry, paper
contributions by Chinese researchers have been increasing ever since 2001 (as
opposed to those of Japanese and American researchers) and have made China
to become the global center of research for rare earth science and technology
(Adachi et al., 2010). These efforts not only made China to become a leader in
the world rare earth ore production, they also allowed it to gradually move higher
in the value chain. In fact, according to historical export data (UN Statistics
Division, 2013), while there has been a gradual decrease in China’s exports of
rare earths in form of compounds and phosphors since early 2000s, the exports
of magnets and motors, and later of high-tech products like cellular phones and
electric motors have been picking up in recent years.
There are two conclusions to be drawn from this discussion. First, China owes
its dominant position in the entire rare earths supply chain to its long term S&T
policies. Second, the recent industrial policies not only threaten the availability
of supply of rare earths compounds and metals to rest of the world, they also
threaten to shift the entire supply chain to China.
3.2.3 Can the World Compete?
As discussed previously, abundant reserves of minerals containing rare earths
are distributed globally. For example, bastna¨site is mined in Mountain Pass,
California - currently the largest non-Chinese deposit of predominantly LREE.
Lateritic material in Australia’s Mount Weld and Brazilian Araxa´ is also en-
riched with deposits with high LREE/HREE ratios. Finally, LREE-dominated
Monazite-rich laterite hard-rocks are being examined in under-explored areas of
Africa. Instead, peralkaline ingenuous rocks in Russia’s Kola Peninsula are a
rich deposit of HREE (Walters and Lusty, 2011; Castor and Hedrick, 2006; Long
et al., 2010). Also, discovery of the latter has been reported in Greenland, Swe-
den and Canada, as well as at seabed of Pacific Ocean. In general, the world’s
largest rare earth deposits were discovered in North Korea, though no official
statistics exist (Els, 2013). As of 2011, there were in total 381 projects outside
China located across 35 different countries (Hatch, 2011b). Table 9 in Appendix
A lists a selection of the most advanced non-Chinese projects as identified by
Hatch (2014), based on relative in-situ quantities and on relative physical dis-
tributions of specific REO. All these projects contain LREE-rich minerals, in
particular lanthanum, cerium and neodymium oxides. But only a few of them
are sources of HREE dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium oxides, namely Bokan,
Norra Ka¨r, Kutessay II, Kipawa, Strange Lake and Nechalacho Basal. The top
five ranked projects in terms of critical rare earth oxide (CREO) rich deposits
are Mount Weld, Steenkampskraal, Bokan, Strange Lake and Norra Ka¨rr. Re-
spective distributions and REO grades can be retrieved from (Hatch, 2014).
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Most of these projects are currently still under development with stages varying
from feasibility studies to initial drilling. Some of the industry experts do not
expect the majority of the projects to develop into actual mines, forecasting a suc-
cess rate of 1-2%, many of the junior projects already fighting insolvency (Hatch,
2011b; Kingsnorth, 2013a; Schlumpberger, 2013). Moreover, deployment of the
few successful ones is not expected to occur before 2017 (Kingsnorth, 2013a).
The main barriers to market entry are long lead times due to lengthy mine
permitting procedures of up to 10 years (Clagett, 2013), environmental consid-
erations in view of higher ecological standards in developed countries, but also
financing (for illustration, capital costs for Nechalacho project were estimated
at $1.575 billion (Avalon, 2014)), and lack of capabilities in terms of technically
trained personnel with expertise and experience in various aspects of rare earths
processing and engineering in western hemisphere (Gschneidner Jr, 2010).
For what concerns the already producing mines, Mount Weld and Mountain Pass
are currently the largest projects with yearly productions capacities of 11’000
tonnes and 15’000 tonnes, respectively - both having the possibility to increase
these further depending on the market conditions. However, looking at their
annual sales figures at 5’626 tonnes and 13’118 tonnes of REO for 2013 respec-
tively, both fall short of their production quotas (Lynas, 2014; Molycorp, 2014).
While this is caused by currently low demands of cerium - the major product of
the two - it is expected that the increased demand for permanent magnets and
electric vehicle batteries will increase demand for lanthanum and neodymium -
their other major REO products. Another source of non-Chinese rare earths is
a the Indian Rare Earths project which is mining and processing monazite to
yield cerium, neodymium, praseodymium and lanthanum in Kerala. Of the CIS
countries, Russia and Kyrgyzstan are in possession of rare earths which however
are currently not mined, though production occurs from stockpiles. Despite the
low shares of global production of Lynas, Molycorp and Indian Rare Earths -
only 2%, 4% and 3% respectively in 2013 - these are expected to remain the ma-
jor sources of non-Chinese LREE and their share to increase in the future. CIS
currently supplies 2% of global market and is expected to expand its operations
in 2015 for production of HREE (Prentice et al., 2013). Currently there exist no
HREE producers outside China.
Besides ensuring countries’ internal availability of rare earths, additional trends
have emerged as a response to Chinese industrial policies. On the level of coun-
tries, rare earths importers strive to diversify sources of supply by strengthening
relations with rare earths producers in order to secure foreign resources. Es-
pecially Europe and Japan, which do not have access to domestic rare earths
resources unlike the US, have been active in pursuing rare earths diplomacy by
setting up cooperation with other countries to commonly explore rare earths.
In case of the latter, joint projects with Vietnam (Toyota/Sojitz - Government
of Vietnam), with India (Toyota - Indian Rare Earths) and with Kazakhstan
(Sumitomo - Kazatomprom) are expected to come online by 2016 (Fontanella-
Khan, 2010; Kingsnorth, 2013a; Sumitomo Corporation, 2012). The EU intends
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to pursue raw material diplomacy through policy and raw materials dialogues,
such as the Africa-EU Joint Strategy 2011-2013 (European Commission, 2011).
On the level of companies, two strategies are pursued. Some companies started
to relocate their permanent magnet manufacturing facilities to China in order to
secure stable and cheaper supply of rare earths (Hayes-Labruto et al., 2013). In-
deed, as stated out by the vice-chairman of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region:
“imposing controls and reducing exports aim to attract more factories using rare
earth metals from home and abroad to Inner Mongolia” (Dingding, 2009). In
fact, China’s double pricing of rare earths in favour of domestic companies and
joint ventures (see Table 6) encourages moving production facilities, and with
them also technological capabilities, to China. The latter then benefits from for-
eign technology and knowledge of permanent magnets in its own efforts to climb
up the value chain of rare earth products. Other companies responded by cre-
ating various linkages across the supply chain. On the downstream side, Lynas
assures a yearly supply of 9’000 tonnes to Sojitz, and Molycorp of 10’000 tonnes
of rare earths to Mitsubishi (Watanabe and Suzuki, 2012). Similarly, through
a strategic alliance with Lynas, Rhodia secures its supply of LREE (Brindal,
2010), while Toyota is to source HREE in the future from Matamec’s Kipawa
deposit (Miller, 2014). On the upstream side, Molycorp and Hitachi agreed to
create a joint venture with the aim of producing rare earth alloys and magnets.
This will assure Molycorp a fully integrated position across mine-to-magnets
supply chain (Stynes, 2010). Furthermore, Avalon Rare Metals entered into an
agreement with Solvay under which the latter will process its concentrates into
REO, among others dysprosium, terbium, yttrium and lutetium Avalon Rare
Metals (2014).
To sum up, the rest of the world tries to mitigate import dependence of rare
earths on China by opening new mines, by tightening relations with countries
in possession of rare earths-rich deposits and by closing strategic alliances on
company level. While the former is a long term strategy, the latter two are
viable in short term. In conclusion, from the discussion on industrial uses and
on Chinese hegemony in both production and supply of rare earths, it becomes
clear that tighter supply might adversely impact adoption of technologies which
rely on these. In this light, the next section analyses the demand side as driven
by low carbon technologies, in an attempt to establish to what extent potential
supply shortages pose barriers to deployment of these technologies.
4 Demand Push
Increased demand for rare earths is the other side of the coin in the discussion
of rare earths supply risk. Based on estimates by Kingsnorth (2013c), global de-
mand for rare earths has increased from 85,000 tonnes in 2009 to 125,000 tonnes
in 2013, and is forecasted to increase further to 150,000 - 170,000 tonnes in 2016
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and to 200,000 - 240,000 tonnes in 2020. While this represents an increase by
almost 200% for rare earths as a group, one has to keep in mind that individ-
ual rare earths differ in their uses across technologies. This in turn influences
their respective demands. According to data in Figure 9, estimated individual
demand is highest for cerium, lanthanum and neodymium. Together they con-
stitute some 85% of estimated global demand in 2016. Based on information in
Table 2, demand for these is driven predominantly by hybrid and electric vehicles
and by wind turbines, as well as by mobile devices, catalysts, glass and water
purification. Indeed, Kingsnorth (2013c) estimates yearly growth rates between
2013-2016 of 4-6% for catalysts and glass and of 8-12% for permanent magnets.
The latter may further increase up to 20-25% annually by 2020. The large shares
of LREE in the demand as a whole are due to the generally larger quantities
these are used in within various technologies. On the contrary, shares of HREE in
total demand are relatively small. In spite of this, one should not underestimate
their functional criticality. For example, dysprosium only constitutes 1% of the
total rare earth demand but is indispensable in permanent magnets due to its
ability to increase latter’s coercive force and magnetic flux density. In line with
this, Alonso et al. (2012a) forecasts an increase of up 724%, 669% and 2630%
during the coming 25 years, for neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium,
originating from production of wind turbines and electric vehicles which rely on
permanent magnets.5 Additionally, strong demand growth is driven by compet-
itive pressures from other technologies making use of permanent magnets, such
as mobile phones and computing.
Figure 9: Global Demand Forecast for Individual Rare Earths, Accuracy of Data +/-
20% (in tonnes), 2016.
Source: Adapted from Kingsnorth (2013c). Data are a courtesy of Professor Kingsnorth.
It becomes clear that an increased adoption of low carbon technologies, driven by
institutional setting such as the EU’s Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-
5These are upper bound projections in absence of reuse, recycling and efficiency-in-use im-
provements, assuming aggressive automotive electrification, all wind using permanent magnets,
while other rare earths market demand growing at historical rates.
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Plan) on the one hand, and by growth of emerging economies on the other, is to
exercise pressure on some rare earths to a larger extent than on others. In this
light, the present section examines the specific case of offshore wind turbines
and of advanced technology vehicles - the two technologies which were identified
by scientific literature as major drivers of change in rare earths demand, and
which are incorrectly claimed by headlines of newspaper articles as impossible
to be manufactured without rare earths content. The analysis is carried out
by compiling an overview of existent offshore wind turbine and advanced tech-
nology vehicle designs and by establishing their respective rare earths contents
in permanent magnets and batteries. For this purpose, specialised engineering
literature is analysed. In the next step, current and future trends in deploying
particular technology designs is determined. A database is created collecting in-
formation on installed offshore wind turbines in current and future projects, as
well as on advanced technology vehicle models and battery types. Based on the
information on the rare earths intensity of respective topologies, the cumulative
shares in rare earths consumption are determined.
4.1 Offshore Wind Turbines
The central priority of the SET-Plan is to create a low-carbon economy and
wind power is one of the technologies foreseen to contribute to this transition
(Moss et al., 2011). Wind is the fastest growing renewable energy source, having
increased 8-fold over the past 10 years (Global Wind Energy Council, 2014).
But limited space for further development of wind energy onshore, availability
of higher wind speeds and opportunities to launch industrial wind projects of
magnitudes parallel to power stations, led to progressive siting of wind turbines
offshore (Hau and Renouard, 2013). In line with this, recent R&D projects are
focusing on challenges primarily in offshore technology, specifically on increasing
their capacity, on alternative support structures, on farm layout optimization as
well as on their protection (Sun et al., 2012). In terms of drive train innovations
the focus lies on improvement of reliability of gearbox and on development of
direct drive and hybrid drivetrain technologies. In that the later prove relevant
in the context of rare earths supply risk, their topology is discussed in below.
In the evolution of wind turbine technology, early machines operated at con-
stant speed with gearbox and squirrel cage generator (SCIG) and were later re-
placed by variable speed machines with doubly-fed induction generators (DFIG)
(Kostopoulos et al., 2012). This traditional design with gearbox connecting
generator with rotor is also denoted as conventional Danish concept and is con-
sidered as one of the two main standard designs. In this arrangement, gearbox
converts mechanical rotational motion of rotor into faster revolutions per minute
(rpm) used by generator, which in turn converts mechanical energy into electri-
cal power by spinning magnets around the coil. Multistage gearboxes prove to
be complex machines, the efficiency of gearboxes depending on number of gear
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stages and on power transmitted (Hau and Renouard, 2013). Of designs ranging
from a single to three stage systems of planetary and parallel configurations,
the most common to be found in larger turbines is one with planetary and two
parallel shaft stages. While the main advantage of this traditional wind turbine
design lies within the conversion of rotor torque into rpms used by generator,
the main disadvantage is the large number of moving parts such as wheels and
bearings. If applied offshore, faster wind speeds tend to aggravate the problem
(Morris, 2011). In fact, wear of gearboxes renders the technology unreliable,
main sources of failure stemming from incorrect dimensioning with respect to
load spectra, what makes them most maintenance prone and one of the most
expensive parts of a wind turbine (Hau and Renouard, 2013). While gearboxes
do not suffer from largest failure rates, they have the longest downtime of all tur-
bine parts (Polinder, 2011). In response to this, several efforts were undertaken
to eliminate gearbox failures (NREL, 2007).
After several decades striving to increase reliability of gearboxes by prolonging
their design lives and reducing their servicing schedule, it was proposed to elim-
inate them completely in order to decrease maintenance costs. This resulted
in developing the first gearless generator system in 1992 by Enercon - the di-
rect drive generator with copper windings. In this arrangement, the generator
mounted in the nacelle is directly connected with the rotor shaft (Hau and Re-
nouard, 2013). Enercon’s electric excitation synchronous generator (EESG-DD)
is much larger compared to high speed generator in the traditional gearbox de-
sign. In fact, more electrically excited pole pairs are required in order to generate
electricity at low rotational speed, the larger radius of rotation increasing speed
of the rotation of magnets around the coil. This however causes the genera-
tor to be heavier, what negatively affects weight of tower heads. In addition
to this, electromagnets are fed with electricity from the generator itself what
causes excitation losses. These issues were partially corrected for with replace-
ment of electromagnets by permanent magnets within generator’s rotor - the so
called permanent field excitation generators (PMSG-DD). These do away with
excitation losses and greater power density, increase efficiency and grid compat-
ibility of generators and reduce size of the generator itself and thus eliminate
the heavy nacelle (Hau and Renouard, 2013; Polinder et al., 2006). The design
has quickly been adopted by manufacturers and is currently established as the
second main standard. Its disadvantage lies within additional cost of a fully
rated electronic converter necessary for grid connection (McMillan and Ault,
2010; Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al., 2010), as well as within the cost of rare earths
materials used in permanent magnets (Hau and Renouard, 2013). Even though
the latter has been decreasing over time, it becomes more relevant with larger
dimensions of MW power range wind turbines.
Technology which reduces the use of permanent magnets in wind turbines is
a compromise between the two standards. For example, the Multibird wind
turbine by Areva contains a drive train machine with a single-stage gearbox
combined with a medium speed permanent magnet generator (PMSG - SG).
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This system combines the advantages of the two standards by decreasing the
size, weight and cost and increasing the efficiency of the generator (Hau and
Renouard, 2013; Polinder et al., 2006). A more complex design by Aerodyn is
made up of Super Compact Drivetrain containing a two-stage gearbox with a
permanent magnet generator (PMSG - MG) directly attached to it (Hau and
Renouard, 2013). Finally, the High Temperature Superconductor (HTS) tech-
nology originates from ship propulsion and is currently under development by
American Superconductor, General Electric and Suprapower.
Understanding the difference in these designs is important in the discussion of
how rare earths are impacting the deployment of offshore wind turbines. An
overview of these technologies can be found in Hau and Renouard (2013) and a
discussion on their respective merits and disadvantages in Arabian-Hoseynabadi
et al. (2010); Jensen and Abrahamsen (2011); McMillan and Ault (2010); Polin-
der et al. (2006); Polinder (2011). As can be seen from the information collected
in Table 3, not all wind turbine technologies use rare earths in their genera-
tors. While no permanent magnets are used in either traditional geared and
electrically excited gearless drivetrains, reportedly 650 kg/MW are used in low
speed direct drive machines with permanent magnet excitation. Substantially
smaller permanent magnets are used in hybrid drivetrains, with 160 kg/MW in
medium speed single-stage and 80 kg/MW in high speed multi-stage gearbox
machines. In terms of rare earth content, PMSG-DD machines with 250 kg of
neodymium, dysprosium, praseodymium and terbium use up 10 times more rare
earths per MW of power produced than hybrid designs (Vestas, 2013; Wittrup,
2011). Compared to this, YBCO coated conductors of HTS generators utilise
minute quantities of yttrium, barium and copper per MW (Janssen et al., 2012).
Figures reported in Table 3 are estimates. In fact, there is a lack of consensus
on permanent magnet content in wind turbines, opinions on permanent magnet
content within direct drive generators ranging from 500-625 kg/MW (Constan-
tinides, Steve, 2010) through 600-800 kg/MW (Jensen et al., 2013), up to 1000
kg/MW reported by various consultancies. Magnet and rare earth contents re-
ported in Table 3 are based on information by Jensen and Abrahamsen (2011);
Lacal Ara´ntegui et al. (2012). For what concerns the share of rare earths in
permanent magnets, this amounts up to 35% according to patent information
(Fujimura et al., 1997; Fujimori et al., 2010; Nobutoki et al., 2007). This is in
line with rare earth contents indicated below.
Now that different drive train technologies have been examined along with the
extent to which these rely on rare earth permanent magnets, it proves interest-
ing to examine how widespread is the use of these technologies in reality. For
this purpose, all offshore wind farm projects were screened globally. Data was
collected from dedicated online databases and news portals on offshore wind
(4C Offshore, 2014) (Pierrot, 2014; Recharge, 2013; Wind Power Offshore, 2013;
Wind Power Monthly, 2013; Offshore Wind, 2013) and enriched with information
on generator designs from manufacturers’ websites. The results are presented in
Figure 10, illustrating shares of various technologies within offshore wind market
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Table 3: Generator Types in Wind Turbine Technologies and Their Respective Per-
manent Magnet and Rare Earths Contents.
Wind Turbine Gearbox Generator PermanentMagnet Rare Earths
Geared Drivetrain Single-Stage Induction (IG) - -
Multi-Stage Wound Rotor Induction(WRIG) - -
Squirrel Cage (SCIG-MG) - -
Doubly Fed Induction
(DFIG-MG) - -
Direct Drive - Electrical ExcitedSynchronous (EESG-DD) - -
Permanent Magnet Excited
Synchronous (PMSG-DD) 650 kg/MW
250 kg/MW
(Nd, Dy, Pr,
Tb)
High Temperature
Superconducting (HTS) -
YBCO: 0.1
kg/MW
(Y, La, Ce)
Hybrid Single-Stage Permanent MagnetSynchronous (PMSG-SG) 160 kg/MW
45 kg/MW
(Nd, Dy, Pr,
Tb)
High Temperature
Superconducting (HTS) -
YBCO: 0.02
kg/MW
(Y, La, Ce)
Multi-Stage Permanent MagnetSynchronous (PMSG-MG) 80 kg/MW
25 kg/MW
(Nd, Dy, Pr,
Tb)
Source: Complied based on information from (Buchert, 2011; Hau and Renouard, 2013; Jensen and
Abrahamsen, 2011; Lacal Ara´ntegui et al., 2012; Polinder, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011).
taking into consideration all projects commissioned by end of April 2014.6 In to-
tal, 99 offshore wind projects have been operating 2’463 turbines and producing
7.62 GW of offshore wind power globally. Following observations stand out: in
terms of capacity generated as illustrated in Figure 10a, the most widely spread
design is the conventional geared drive train with squirrel cage generator, which
together with doubly-fed induction generator make up 96% of current offshore
market. Permanent magnet driven technology lags significantly behind covering
the remaining market share of 4%, with an equal split of 2% between direct
drive and hybrid generator designs. Looking at the distribution of generator
types across projects in Figure 10b, 16% of all commissioned projects make use
of permanent market drivetrain technology. This can be explained by the fact
that many of these turbines are currently at prototype stage and are being tested
in low numbers at various test sites. Finally, average power range of generator
types is illustrated in Figure 12a. While conventional geared drive train designs
have similar average powers of 2.88 MW for SCIG and of 2.77 MW for DFIG, this
is substantially higher for PMSG overall topologies with 3.45 MW. The average
of 4.50 MW for EESG-DD is to be interpreted with caution since currently there
is only one Enercon turbine deployed offshore worldwide. Having said this, one
can conclude that PMSG drivetrains, though with currently lower market share,
tend to be deployed within larger power range turbines. While the UK is the
leader in total installed offshore capacity, followed by Denmark and Germany, by
6The analysis is carried out on the level of deployment phase of a farm rather than of wind
farms themselves.
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far the most permanent magnet driven machines are at present deployed offshore
in China. All of these are of direct drive designs and are supplied by Chinese
manufacturers Goldwind or XEMX.
Figure 10: Generators in Commissioned Global Offshore Wind Projects.
(a) Total Capacity (MW) (b) Number of Projects
Note: Based on fully commissioned global offshore wind projects by end of April 2014, test sites included
(unless set up onshore). Additionally, partially generating projects with installed capacities announced
were included. Some of the projects still operate old wind turbine technology - these were classified
as “others”. Source: Data collected from websites of respective wind turbine manufacturers, as well as
from 4C Offshore, 2014 Offshore Wind (2013); Recharge (2013); Pierrot (2014); Wind Power Monthly
(2013); Wind Power Offshore (2013).
In order to determine the growth of PMSG technology deployment in offshore
wind, data on projects currently under construction was collected as well. Within
this dataset, capacity generated increases by more than half to 12.72 GW and
number of turbines increases to 3’871. Also, looking at Figure 11a share of
PMSG turbines increases to 16% of total capacity, with shares of hybrid models
increasing to 5% and 6% for single and multi-stage gearboxes respectively, while
share of direct drive machines increases to 5%. Share of projects relying on per-
manent magnet driven technology increases to 21% - see Figure 11b. Figure 12b
indicates that the average power range of permanent magnet excited machines
increases slightly to 3.62 MW and the total capacity produced increases by 600%
- from currently 284 MW to 2’000 MW of produced power once these projects
turn fully operational. At the same time, increase in geared drivetrains remains
below 50%. Market share of electrically excited generator technology remains
unchanged. To summarize, there is acceleration in deploying permanent magnet
drivetrains in the near future, at the expense of traditional geared technologies.
This trend is predominantly driven by Germany which is planning to add 600
MW of power produced by PMSG turbines offshore, followed by China and the
UK with 464 MW and 436 MW respectively, and Belgium with half as much
additional power produced at full commissioning of projects. While Belgium
and Germany will be installing only hybrid drives, half of added MW by PMSG
machines in China and the UK will be produced by direct drive generator wind
turbines.
This trend is further confirmed by an overview of the largest wind turbines with
power range of up to 10 MW (Power Technology, 2014). Six out of 10 use per-
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Figure 11: Generators in Commissioned Global Offshore Wind Projects and in Projects
under Construction.
(a) Total Capacity (MW) (b) Number of Projects
Note: Based on global offshore wind projects which were fully or partially commissioned or are under
construction in 2014, test sites included (unless set up onshore). Projects under construction where
turbine types were not publicly announced were omitted. Some of the projects still operate old wind
turbine technology - these were classified as “others”. Source: Data collected from websites of respective
wind turbine manufacturers, as well as from 4C Offshore, 2014 Offshore Wind (2013); Recharge (2013);
Pierrot (2014); Wind Power Monthly (2013); Wind Power Offshore (2013).
manent magnet driven synchronous generator, one is electrically excited direct
drive, one uses HTS and the remaining two utilise conventional gearbox technol-
ogy. For completeness, note that three out of the 6 machines are direct drive,
while the other three have hybrid design. There has also been a tendency to
increase size of wind turbines with the purpose of reducing costs and improv-
ing environmental profile of wind energy (Caduff et al., 2012). Looking at the
evolution of power ratings, turbine sizes were increasing from 50 kW with rotor
diameter of 15 m in the 1980s, through 10 MW with rotor diameters of 190 m and
more to-date, with up to 20 MW turbines currently under development (Chan-
dler, 2004; InnWind, 2013). Having said this, it is important to note that with
increasing power range of a turbine, also the amount of rare earths increases. For
example, the currently largest PMSG-DD wind turbine of 10 MW would contain
10 times more magnets than turbines with 1 MW power range. Assuming a rare
earth content of 250 kg/MW as specified in Table 3, this implies an increase to
approximately 2.5 tonnes in total. In reality, 108 tonnes of permanent magnets
and 40 tonnes of rare earths were used for all currently commissioned offshore
wind farm projects. Additionally, for all newly installed turbines in projects un-
der construction, manufacturing of generators requires 430 tonnes of permanent
magnets. With a rare earths content of approximately 150 tonnes, this implies
an increase in demand by 380%. Nevertheless, in terms of consumption of in-
dividual rare earths, this only represents less than half a percent of respective
neodymium and dysprosium supplies forecasted for 2014. For completeness, note
that China, unlike the rest of the world, has been installing PMSG-DD technol-
ogy onshore as well. This becomes obvious when looking at sales figures of some
of the Chinese wind turbine manufacturers. For example, in 2013 Goldwind sold
2’912 MW of direct drive turbine technology, which is by far more than fore-
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Figure 12: Average Power Ranges of Generators.
(a) Generators in Commissioned Global Offshore Wind Projects.
(b) Generators in Commissioned Global Offshore Wind Projects
and in Projects under Construction.
Source: Data collected from websites of respective wind turbine manufacturers, as well as from 4C
Offshore, 2014 Offshore Wind (2013); Recharge (2013); Pierrot (2014); Wind Power Monthly (2013);
Wind Power Offshore (2013).
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seen to be installed in global offshore projects in near term (Goldwind, 2014).7
If considered in calculation, permanent magnets used in onshore wind turbines
add to the consumption of rare earths, though not substantially.
It would have been interesting to offer a longer term perspective on developments
in offshore turbine technology market. Unfortunately, for most of “consent au-
thorised” projects wind turbine models have not been decided on yet. Same
applies for those in “consent application submitted” and in “concept” stages.
But considering total capacities foreseen to be installed within all consented
projects, once fully commissioned they will produce between 29-31 GW wind
power: 22.25 GW in Europe - with Germany, the UK and the Netherlands
constituting over 70% - and 8.9 GW in the rest of the world - predominantly
in China. In general, future expansion of offshore wind is tied to regulatory
stability, as well as to existence of cable routes and high voltage transmission
lines linking offshore wind farms to mainland grid (Hau and Renouard, 2013).
Penetration of PMSG topologies in particular, will depend on availability risk
and pricing volatility of rare earths on the one hand, and competition from al-
ternative technologies on the other. There exist no estimates on market share
of PMSG topologies offshore. For example, while Buchert (2011) expects that
share of direct drive drivetrains will increase to 15-40% by 2020 for the entire
wind market, Moss et al. (2011) assume a European penetration of 15% and
20% for wind turbines with permanent magnet technology in 2020 and 2030,
respectively. At this stage it proves difficult to predict the future technology
mix. Share of traditional geared machines, which despite of improvements are
most maintenance prone, is expected to diminish overtime. While, it does not
seem that either electromagnets or high temperature superconductors would in-
crease their respective market shares in the short to medium term, once testing
has been completed, these technologies might become a viable option due to
decreased capex and opex, as well as to increased efficiency when applied within
larger power ranges. As the only commercially available alternative to gear-
boxes at present, it is probable that PMSG technology is to catch momentum
in short run. In fact, considering its technical advantages and the global trend
towards wind turbines with larger diameters, and assuming the current tendency
in deployment to be further strengthened with operator’s need to decrease opex
and to increase efficiency, as well as timely commercialisation of such turbine
models by new entrants, it can be expected that PMSG technology will gain on
market share substantially. However, for this technology to remain cost com-
petitive it is important that supply of neodymium, dysprosium, and partially
praseodymium and terbium remains undistorted both in terms of quantities and
price volatilities.
In conclusion, considering the variety of drivetrain designs available on the mar-
ket, further adoption of offshore wind energy per se is not impeded by potential
supply shortage of rare earths. Contrary to this, the deployment of permanent
7While sold does not imply installed, this figure is a good indication of importance of direct
drive technology onshore.
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magnet technology in particular, might become prone to supply risk, depending
on its total market share and level of hybridisation adopted. In fact, considering
the significant price volatility of rare earths in recent years, even the relatively
small quantities used in individual wind turbines might exercise a significant
pressure on the final price of a wind turbine. This will be illustrated in Section
6.2.
4.2 Advanced Technology Vehicles
Besides reduction of greenhouse gases’ emissions, another main line of argumen-
tation in favour of advanced technology vehicles, is the reduction of importer
countries’ dependence on foreign oil. The question remains though, to what
extent does the technology shift from internal combustion engine to advanced
technology vehicles expose us to dependence on rare earths.
Electrically powered vehicles were invented in Scotland and the US beginning of
the 19th century. The technology boomed in late 19th and early 20th century,
these vehicles becoming top sellers in the US. However, cheap and abundant oil
as well as invention of electric starter motor, lack of battery technology fulfilling
performance requirements and relatively low price of the mass produced Ford-T
model prevented electrically powered vehicles from keeping up the competition
with conventional internal combustion engine vehicles (Constantinides, 2013;
Kirsch, 2000; Ovshinsky et al., 1993; Trigg and Telleen, 2013). Nonetheless,
they caught a second breath with oil crises and more stringent environmental
regulations of transportation. Based on the level of their hybridisation, modern
vehicles can be classified into internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), hybrid
electric vehicles and all-electric vehicles (AEV). Their respective hybridisation
factors are provided in Tie and Tan (2013). The latter two can be further broken
down based on energy sources used into battery, fuel cell and solar energy models.
While all the three types have in common the electric motor drives, they differ in
configurations. Namely, fuel cell vehicles (FCV) are powered by hydrogen and
oxygen converted by chemical reaction into electricity within fuel cell stacks,
while photovoltaic cell vehicles (PCV) are powered by sunray which is converted
into electrical energy within solar cells (C¸ag˘atay Bayindir et al., 2011; Hannan
et al., 2014). These two technologies are still in early stages of development and
are not part of the present analysis. For what concerns the battery technology,
this differs based on the extent to which it is used to propel vehicles. An overview
is provided in Table 4. Battery electric vehicles (BEV) are propelled entirely by
battery packs, while full-hybrid vehicles (HEV) run on fuel alone, and plug-in
hybrids (PHEV) use the combination of gasoline and battery. Both HEV and
PHEV use battery as power storage units. In case of the former, the discharged
battery is recharged by ICE or regenerative braking, while it is plugged in to
charging stations in case of PHEV and BEV (C¸ag˘atay Bayindir et al., 2011; Tie
and Tan, 2013) and (IEAHEV, 2013).
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One thing all advanced technology vehicles have in common is the electric mo-
tor in their drivetrains. Essentially electric motor is the reverse of generator:
while the latter transforms mechanical energy to electricity as discussed in case
of wind turbines, the former converts electricity to mechanical energy in alter-
native vehicles. An overview of main motor design drives together with their
specifications and comparison of performance is provided by Pellegrino et al.
(2012). In short, the most common design is the permanent magnet motor with
currently more than 80% of market share, as compared to the induction motor
with market share of 11% only (Burwell et al., 2013). This is due to its supe-
riority in terms of performance, efficiency and reliability - a comparison across
alternative drivetrains can be found in Tashakori et al. (2010). Just like in wind
turbines, magnets in electric motors contain neodymium, dysprosium and traces
of praseodymium and terbium. It has been estimated that an electric motor of
an electric powered vehicle contains some 0.6 kg of rare earths (Alonso et al.,
2012b).
Table 4: Vehicle Technologies Classified by Hybridisation and Their Respective Rare
Earths Contents.
Hybridisation EnergyModels
Propulsion
(Rare
Earths)
Powered by
Battery
(Rare
Earths)
Other (Rare
Earths)
Internal Combustion
Engine Vehicle (ICEV) ICE Vehicle
Gasoline or
Diesel Engine
(-)
Fuel - 0.22-0.44
kg:
Nd, Ce, Pr,
Dy, La
Hybrid Electric Vehicle*
Full-Hybrid
Electric
Vehicle (HEV)
Gasoline
Engine and
Electric Motor
(0.6 kg: Nd,
Dy, Pr, Tb)
Fuel Alone
NiMH (3.5 kg:
La, Ce, Nd,
Pr);
Li-ion, LiPo,
PbA (-)
Plug-in Hybrid
Electric
Vehicle
(PHEV)
Fuel & Battery Li-ion, LFP (-)
All-electric Vehicle
(AEV)
Battery
Electric
Vehicle (BEV) Electric Motor
Alone
(0.6 kg: Nd,
Dy, Pr, Tb)
Battery Li-ion, LFP,LiPo, PbA (-)
Fuel Cell
Vehicle (FCV) Hydrogen -
Photovoltaic
Cell Vehicle
(PCV)
Sunray -
*There are six types of hybrid electric vehicle drivetrain architectures: mild-HEV and full-HEV, while
the latter can be further split among parallel full-HEV, series full-HEV, series-parallel full-HEV and
complex full-HEV, as well as PHEV. These differ in use of propulsion power and in configurations.
Sources: Complied based on information published on websites of car manufacturers and from Alonso
et al. (2012b); C¸ag˘atay Bayindir et al. (2011); China Auto Web (2014); Hannan et al. (2014); Hybrid
Autos (2014); Hybrid Cars (2014); Kopera (2004); Plug-In Cars (2014); Tie and Tan (2013) and DOE,
2014; IEAHEV, 2013.
The case of batteries is somewhat different in that several battery technologies
co-exist on the market. The function of batteries in advanced technology ve-
hicles is to store chemical energy and to convert it into electrical energy used
to power vehicles. While in case of HEV, battery stores energy generated from
regenerative breaking, BEV and PHEV are charged externally. The extent of
power produced depends on the chemical composition of the cell, among others.
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An overview of secondary battery systems is reported in Van den Bossche et al.
(2006); Catenacci et al. (2013); Kopera (2004); R˚ade and Andersson (2001);
Rydh and Sva¨rd (2003); Tie and Tan (2013). Battery technologies currently
used in respective vehicle energy models are summarised within the fifth column
of Table 4. Two most widespread technologies - nickel metal-hydride (NiMH)
and lithium-ion (Li-ion) - are discussed in detail, while the other ones are only
touched upon shortly since these are either outdated - nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd)
and lead acid (PbA) - or still in stage of development - zinc-air (Zn-air), lithium-
sulphur (Li-S) and lithium-iron phosphate (LFP) - or have currently very low
market share due to their unproven viability - Zebra and lithium- metal-polymer
(LiPo).
The NiMH battery is made up of a positive nickel hydroxide electrode and a
negative electrode of hydrogen absorbed in metal alloy. The most commonly used
metal hydride is a multi-element alloy of the type MN(Ni,Co,Al,Mn) 5. Such
batteries contain up to 10% mischmetal (MN), made up primarily of lanthanum
and to some lesser extent of cerium, neodymium and praseodymium, as well as
of metallic impurities (Constantinides, 2013; Kopera, 2004; Lichtenberg et al.,
1997; Ovshinsky et al., 1993; Shukla et al., 2001). Various aspects of NiMH
battery technology have been continuously improving over the past 25 years,
what contributed to its widespread commercial use, mainly within electrically
powered vehicles. Indeed, when compared to Ni-Cd and PbA technologies, main
advantages are its long life, safety, use of non-toxic components and energy
density. Nonetheless, major costs of NiMH batteries are tied to commodities
such as rare earths and nickel. In fact, their large use of rare earths - 3.5 kg as
estimated by Alonso et al. (2012b) - was one of the reasons why other types of
batteries started to catch up. In this light, with development of Li-ion battery
the use of rare earths has been eliminated. Its positive electrode involves one of
the three families: lithium cobalt, nickel or manganese oxide, and has graphite
for its negative electrode (Broussely et al., 1997; Rydh and Sva¨rd, 2003). In
case of LFP, the cathode consists of LiFePO 4 and aluminium foil (Zackrisson
et al., 2010), while in case of LiPo, it is made up of polymer materials. Besides
the fact that this technology does not contain rare earths, it is also considered
superior in terms of twice as high power and energy densities and its lower
weight, implying a greater storage in smaller volume when compared to NiMH
batteries (Constantinides, 2013; Kopera, 2004). This has however been achieved
at the expense of almost twice as high cost and shorter cycle life. In general,
battery characteristics translate into vehicle’s overall performance (Ovshinsky
et al., 1993). For those using Li-ion technology this implies lighter vehicles with
better performance but also smaller range driven without recharging, as well
as additional fire safety considerations due to chemical properties of lithium
(Baker and Krisher, 2013; The Economist, 2014; Mart´ın, 2013; Wojdyla, 2011).
Consequently, further applied research is required to improve on these (Catenacci
et al., 2013). For completeness, the availability of lithium production which is
concentrated in South America also needs to be taken into consideration.
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Now that an overview of various designs of batteries has been provided, it proves
interesting to examine to what extent manufacturers adopt individual designs
within their vehicles. For this purpose, global data on advanced technology ve-
hicle models in production by end of 2014 was collected. Only passenger cars
were taken into account. Buses, heavy duty vehicles, motorcycles and three-
wheelers are not within the scope of this analysis. Also, vehicles in prototype
or pre-production stages and those not mass produced were excluded, while
discontinued models were kept. This dataset was enriched by information on
battery usage as indicated by respective manufacturer websites and dedicated
online portals. The results are summarised in Figure 13a. The most diffused
in terms of share of vehicle models is the lithium technology, led by Li-ion with
49% of total share of vehicle models, followed by LFP and LiPo - both emerg-
ing technologies with low shares of 10% and 5%, respectively. NiMH batteries
are employed within nearly a third of currently available advanced technology
vehicle models, what makes them the second most deployed battery technology.
However, when looking at the breakdown of uses across specific vehicle energy
models as illustrated in Figure 13b, it becomes obvious that the latter are only
used within HEV. The reason behind are limitations in specific power and energy
densities, as well as lack of scalability with respect to size. In fact, while HEV
are propelled by both ICE and electric motor, in BEV and to some extent in
PHEV it is the battery which powers the electric drivetrain and hence higher
performance of the former is required. This makes NiMH batteries less suitable
to be deployed in the latter two energy models (Axsen et al., 2008; Bitsche and
Gutmann, 2004). Finally, share of PbA technology is relatively small at 5% and
is mostly only used within discontinued models.
In terms of rare earths quantities used, Bryce (2010); SAE International (2010)
claim Toyota Prius to be the most rare earths intensive consumer product ever
made with its 11 kg of rare earths content. However, other sources are more
moderate with their estimates ranging from 2.17 kg to 2.45 kg of rare earths
in Prius II batteries alone (Bauer et al., 2011; Schu¨ler et al., 2011). Finally,
according to estimates by Alonso et al. (2012b), a hypothetical mid-size HEV
with a nickel metal hydride battery, contains 3.5 kg and 0.6 kg of rare earths
within its battery and electric motor respectively, and another up to 0.44 kg
scattered across over 700 vehicle parts. The latter quantity is contained in
all conventional ICEV - for example neodymium and dysprosium within small
magnets contained in sunroof and automatic door locks, or cerium in catalytic
converter (Alonso et al., 2012b). In fact, two thirds of the quantity is estimated
to be made up of neodymium, 18% of cerium, 7% of praseodymium and 6%
of dysprosium, the share of other rare earths being below 1% each. Note that
this quantity decreases to half when considering rare earths content in basic
vehicles in developing countries. As negligible as these quantities sound across
single vehicles, for the total of 87.25 million vehicles produced globally in 2013
(OICA, 2014), 29’700 tonnes of rare earths elements were used based on the
above assumptions. This quantity when converted into REO content using the
conversion ratio of 1:0.85 as suggested by Goonan (2011), constitutes as much
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Figure 13: Battery Technologies Deployed in Advanced Technology Vehicles.
(a) Batteries in Advanced Technology Vehicle Models
(b) Batteries across Vehicle Energy Models
Note: Based on mass produced electric passenger cars in production by 2014. Buses, heavy duty
vehicles, motorcycles and three-wheelers not considered. Includes also recently discontinued models.
Excludes those in concept and pre-production stages. Source: Compiled based on data collected from
websites of car manufacturers and from China Auto Web (2014); Hybrid Autos (2014); Hybrid Cars
(2014); Plug-In Cars (2014) and DOE, 2014.
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as 31% of global rare earths supply for 2013. In terms of individual rare earths,
this implies that approximately 70% and 120% of forecasted global neodymium
and dysprosium supplies for 2014 are used for designing these vehicle features
alone. When considering tighter supply estimated for 2016 (Kingsnorth, 2013c),
the respective consumptions would increase to 80% and 210%.
In order to determine the quantities of rare earths used in electrically powered ve-
hicles, it is important to first establish the actual global share of separate energy
models as well as share of battery technologies deployed within these. Unfor-
tunately, it turns out difficult to determine the exact quantities, since global
stock or sales figures broken down to car maker/model levels are not publicly
available. Hence, an estimation was carried out based on information gathered
from various sources, such as EV Obsession (2013); evsroll.com (2013); Green
Car Congress (2014); Hybrid Cars (2013); Mock (2013); Sehgal (2013); Schreﬄer
(2013); Stoddard (2013); Trigg and Telleen (2013); World Nuclear Association
(2014) and JADA, 2013, as well as from car manufacturers’ websites. For 2013,
estimates on global vehicles sales are as follows: 93’924 PHEV, 111’718 BEV
and about 1’300’000 HEV. While several different estimates exist, all point to
the general trend of HEV dominating the market with a global share of approx-
imately 86%, while respective shares of PHEV and BEV are approximately 6%
and 8%. Based on data collected on battery technologies in Figure 13 and on
sales figures it was possible to determine major producers of HEV and their bat-
tery usage. Toyota seems to be dominating hybrid vehicles manufacturing with
almost 2/3 of the market share, followed by Honda, Lexus, Nissan and Ford
whose models jointly constitute another quarter of global sales. On the level
of batteries deployed, all of Toyota HEV models (with the exception of Prius
V), as well as all Lexus hybrids and some of Honda models (Insight, CR-Z and
Freed) rely on NiMH batteries. On the contrary, Nissan Serena, Ford Fusion and
C-Max, as well as Honda Accord, Civic and Fit use alternative battery technolo-
gies. Besides these, Hyundai Sonata, Kia Optima and Chevrolet Malibu have
a minor share but none of them uses rare earths in their batteries. It is thus
possible to conclude that NiMH batteries currently have an approximate market
share of 75% of all HEV. This implies that in addition to the 662 tonnes of
rare earths used across various parts, electric motors and batteries in electrically
powered vehicles require 723 tons and 3’413 tons, respectively. This represents
a 5% share of global rare earths supply in 2013. In terms of particular rare
earths, electrically powered vehicles consume 4% of neodymium, 14% of dyspro-
sium and 5% of lanthanum considering respective supplies forecasted for 2014.
In view of tighter supplies in 2016, the share of dysprosium usage increases to
24% (Kingsnorth, 2013c). Finally, considering the growing deployment of elec-
trically powered vehicles projected to reach global sales of 6.1 million by 2023 as
estimated by Fourin Consultants (as cited in Schreﬄer, 2013), these alone would
require 18% of current annual rare earth’s production. This is an approximation
and only holds when assuming that global production stays the same, as well
as market share of NiMH batteries and rare earths permanent magnet motors
remains unchanged, and that no minimisation takes place. In general though,
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due to the uncertainty in deployment trends of energy models and their charging
infrastructures, it is difficult to estimate how much additional demand would be
created by electrically powered vehicles in the future. On the one hand, while
shares of all three energy models are forecasted to increase, those of PHEV and
BEV are expected to grow faster than that of HEV powertrain. In fact, Navigant
Research forecasts a global compound annual growth rate of some 12% for HEV
and of almost a third for both PHEV and BEV by 2020 (Hurst and John, 2013).
This also depends on incentives and regulations by governments, as well as on
fuel prices. Finally price decreases envisaged for Li-ion battery packs and poten-
tial increasing prices of NiMH batteries due to volatilities in rare earths, might
induce manufacturers to substitute latter by former. Nevertheless, as suggested
by several studies (Andersson and R˚ade, 2001; Catenacci et al., 2013; Moss et al.,
2011), in order to avoid technology lock-in, variety in battery technologies should
be supported due to the uncertainties in the material shortages. This implies
that despite the expected paradigm shift to Li-ion technology, market share of
NiMH is to remain substantial in the future as well.
To conclude with, it remains to be seen which of the battery technologies will
dominate the advanced technology vehicles market in the future. Also in terms
of electric motors, possible future development of alternative rare earths free
architectures might replace rare earths permanent magnets. Nonetheless, auto-
motive market and its electrification is substantially dependent on availability of
rare earths. Therefore a potential supply shortage would disrupt the further de-
velopment of the market altogether. To what extent this threat is real, depends
on availability of material substitutes to be used within permanent magnets, as
well as on recycling as an alternative source of rare earths. These are to be
discussed in the upcoming section 5.
5 Curbing Rare Earths Dependence
The aim of this section is to discuss the mitigation strategies pursued on the
upstream side of the supply chain, with the view of curbing the dependence on
rare earths. According to the material life cycle (Graedel et al., 2011), the choice
of product design is important in that it determines the material and product
life cycle, which in turn drive the demand for materials used. In this light, the
following two subsections investigate alternative designs in wind turbine and
electrically powered vehicle technologies, as well as rare earth material substi-
tutes. Next, end-of-life stage is discussed in terms of efficiency of recycling as
an alternative source to primary materials. Finally, stockpiling as a short term
strategy to supply shortage is looked at. Strategies followed by the downstream
side of the supply chain have already been discussed in Section 3.2.3: opening
mines outside China, raw materials diplomacy with exporting countries, and
strategic alliances between producers.
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5.1 Material Substitutes
From the quanto-mechanics standpoint, rare earths are unique due to the con-
figuration of their atom shells which allows them to have unique magnetic in-
teractions with other elements. Also, there exist no perfect substitute elements
which would achieve same levels of magnetism. Mature magnet technologies are
ferrite magnets - based on strontium or barium ferrite - and alloy magnets -
AlNiCo and SmCo as previously discussed. When compared to NdFeB technol-
ogy, these are considered less costly in terms of price volatilities and potential
supply disruption, but at the same time inferior in terms of their lower magne-
tization, magnetocrystalline anisotropy and thus also lower coercivity (Skomski
and Sellmyer, 2009). It is precisely the high coercivity that makes rare earth
high energy density magnets essential for direct drive wind turbines and elec-
tric traction motors of advanced technology vehicles. In line with this, some
of the research streams concentrate on improving the performance of existing
non-rare earths based permanent magnets on the one hand, and the coercivity
of permanent magnets with smaller quantities of neodymium and dysprosium on
the other. At the same time, minimisation is taking place, i.e. development of
nanocomposite magnetic material, whereby Nd- and Fe-based nanoparticles are
mixed together to reach superior magnetic properties. Finally, replacement by
cheaper and more abundant materials is being investigated on. A summary of
major projects related to permanent magnets is provided in Table 5.
In terms of initiatives by countries, the US DoE Advanced Research Projects
Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) provides funding for technologies that eliminate or
minimize use of rare earths, especially through its Rare Earth Alternatives in
Critical Technologies (REACT) program. In Japan, related R&D projects are
implemented by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and New
Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) on the
one hand, and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technol-
ogy (MEXT) and National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS) on the other.
The EU instead, is lacking concentrated capabilities in magnet industry. It
currently runs a collaborative project with view of facilitating networking, map-
ping European substitution initiatives, proposing a roadmap and making re-
spective policy recommendations on substitution of critical raw materials (CRM
Innonet, 2014). Besides this, a European Rare Earths Competency Network
(ERECON) has been established with the view of analysing, among others, Eu-
ropean projects aiming at reducing and substituting rare earths in major appli-
cations (EC, 2014b).
In general, most of the research initiatives listed in Table 5 are in initial stages.
Since these entail basic research one cannot expect new technologies to result
from these. In conclusion, though very important, research on rare earths sub-
stitution pursues long term objectives and is very unlikely to deliver results in
the short to medium term.
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Table 5: Current Projects on Material Substitution of Rare Earths.
Aim Research Organisation Project Description Contribution
METI/NEDO
Enhance coercivity while
reducing dysprosium usage
within permanent magnets in
high temperature
environments.
Reduces amount of dysprosium used
by 30% in 5 years.
Hitachi Metals America
Apply dysprosium vapour
deposition diffusion
technology to NEOMAX
sintered magnets.
Reduces dysprosium while
maintaining high performance at
lower production cost.
Electron Energy Corporation Apply friction consolidationextrusion to powders.
Produces magnets with larger energy
density with reduced rare earths
content.
United Technologies Research
Center
Develop high-efficiency
electric motor using additive
manufacturing technique.
Reduces use of rare earths while
process and design.
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Ames National Laboratory
Improve performance metrics
of non-rare earth based
permanent magnets.
Provides alternative mature magnet
technologies using non-rare earth
materials.
MEXT/NIMS
Develop highly coercive
magnetic powder and metallic
nanoparticles.
Increases coercivity of magnet
powder while eliminating use of
dysprosium and reducing use of
neodymium.
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Aim Research Organisation Project Description Contribution
GE Global Research Research on nanostructuredmagnet materials of NdFeB.
Decreases requirement of rare earths
and leads to more energy-efficient
and power-dense magnets.
Argonne National Laboratory
Research on exchange-spring
magnets with hard magnetic
shell and a soft magnetic core.
Increases performance and lowers
cost using existing materials.
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University of Delaware
Minimise rare earths content
by mixing existing magnet
materials with more
abundant ones, e.g. iron.
Provides magnets with less rare earth
content and twice the energy density
of current magnets.
METI/NEDO
Develop iron-nitrogen
compounds as alternative rare
earth materials.
Provides magnets with superior
magnetic properties using readily
available raw materials.
Ames National Laboratory Develop cerium-transitionmetal (Ce-TM) magnets.
Provides superior magnet technology
to any non-rare earth magnet, using
cerium which is more abundant.
University of Minnesota
Research on alternative
magnet material made up of
iron and nitrogen inputs.
Uses low cost and abundant raw
materials only.
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Darmouth College Swap rare earths formanganese-aluminium alloys.
Guarantees superior properties and
lower cost of magnets.
Northeastern University Replace rare earths byiron-nickel crystal structures.
Manipulates market structures at
atomic level to create superior
magnetic properties as found in
meteorites.
Continued on next page
44
Table 5 – continued from previous page
Aim Research Organisation Project Description Contribution
University of Alabama
Development of iron- and
manganese-based
nanostructured magnets.
Improves performance using low-cost
and more abundant materials.
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory
Develop manganese-based
nanocomposite magnet.
Substantially higher power at higher
temperatures reduces the need for a
cooling system which in turn reduces
price of wind turbines and electric
vehicles.
Virginia Commonwealth
University
Replace rare earths with
low-cost and abundant
carbon-based nanoparticles.
Provides rare earth free alternative to
high performance magnets.R
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Case Western Reserve
University
Develop highly magnetic
iron-nitride alloy.
Reduces overall price of the motor by
replacing rare earths with abundant
and inexpensive iron-nitride powder.
Sources: Complied based on information from (ARPA-E, 2009, 2010, 2012a,b, 2014d,b; Chaturvedi et al., 2014; University of Delaware, 2010; The Daily Fusion, 2013;
Gehm, 2013; Harris et al., 2010; Kawamoto, 2008; Kozawa, 2011; McCallum, 2012; McQuade, 2013; University of Minnesota, 2012; Northeastern University, 2012; Wenning,
2012) (NIMS, 2010a; NIMS, 2010b; NIMS, 2011).
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5.2 Technology Substitutes
The increasing price volatilities of rare earths and their tight supply have spurred
research for new technologies which have less rare earths content, or which elim-
inated their use completely. Substitution on the level of technologies is far more
progressed than innovation on the level of materials.
5.2.1 Alternative Wind Turbine Designs
In case of wind turbines, an alternative to permanent magnet drivetrains dis-
cussed was the gearbox technology. Adding a gearbox to the machine not only
decreases size of the generator, it also reduces quantity of permanent magnets
needed, eventually eliminates them completely. In Section 4.1, single or multi-
ple stage gearbox combined with permanent magnet has been discussed. It has
however also been pointed out that due to its large amount of moving parts, the
operational expenses of wind turbines increase. On the other hand, there have
been constant improvements in gearboxes leading to increased reliability of drive
trains (NREL, 2007) (Reliawind, 2011).
In terms of larger offshore wind turbines, the electrically induced wind turbine
might have been a viable alternative. The downside of this technology is that
it uses current from electrical grid. While Enercon - the major producer of this
technology - currently only targets onshore wind parks and is not expected to
penetrate the offshore market, some of the competitors have been developing this
technology further (Dodd, 2013; Patton, 2012). The future trend towards direct
drive generators is further underpinned by the EU project on developing a 20 MW
wind turbine (INNWIND). While the predecessor of this project (UPWIND)
considered conventional direct drivetrain optimisation, the new project is to
focus on superconductive and magnetic pseudo direct drive generator (PDD)
(InnWind, 2013). This latter concept integrates a low ratio magnetic gear with
a permanent magnet generator, thanks to which costly maintenance and reduced
efficiency of mechanical gearbox on the one hand, and substantial size and cost
of conventional direct drive generators on the other, are eliminated (InnWind,
2014; Magnomatics, 2014).
On the contrary, HTS machines, generating rotor field by superconducting coils,
are intended to reduce generator weight and volume as well as the dependence
on rare earths. This however depends on the conductor technology adopted.
Currently, the AMSC generators use YBCO conductors (yttrium-barium-copper
oxide), while General Electric makes use of niobium-tin superconductors (NbSn)
and Suprapower of magnesium diboride (MgB 2) (Magnusson et al., 2013). Hence,
instead of using neodymium and dysprosium, this design relies on yttrium, lan-
thanum and cerium - the latter two being the most abundant oxides in terms
of supply (Buchert, 2011). Also the content of rare earths is largely reduced
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as compared to permanent magnet. For illustration, a HTS generator in a 5
MW wind turbine requires up to 3.8 kg of YBCO superconducting layer, while
a PMSG-DD generator in a wind turbine of same dimension makes use of 2.3
tonnes of NdFeB permanent magnet (Henriksen, 2011). Whether HTS machines
diffuse to outweigh other offshore technologies remains to be seen. AMSC claims
that thanks to its power density advantage, the HTS technology will become the
leader at 10 MW and higher power ranges (Cleantech Magazine, 2011). How-
ever until the point of their commercial deployment, they need to be tested, their
reliability proven and their costs reduced (Magnusson et al., 2013).
Overall, it remains to be seen which wind turbine technology will dominate the
market going forward. One thing is clear though: in order to make wind energy
competitive, producers need to decrease its costs. This can be achieved by
increasing reliability and manufacturing larger offshore turbines. Should these
be exposed to supply risk of some of the components, it is likely that producers
will shift away to cheaper and more secure alternatives. To which exactly, will
depend on the state of technologies available.
5.2.2 Alternatives to Batteries and Electric Drives in Vehicles
For what concerns the automotive industry, alternative technologies for batteries
in HEV have already been discussed in Section 4.2. Currently, there seems to be
a paradigm shift ongoing from NiMH to lithium technology. The rate at which
this shift occurs will depend on the extent of supply risk and price volatility
of rare earths on the one hand, as well as on price and reliability of the rare
earths-free battery alternatives on the other. As an example, Ford has been
switching away from NiMH battery in its earlier Escape model to Li-ion battery
in its Fusion and C-MAX models. While other technologies are emerging, Li-ion
is expected to dominate the market in the future, with construction of Tesla’s
gigafactory expected to further significantly decrease the manufacturing cost of
batteries (Forbes, 2014).
In terms of electric motors, potential replacement of permanent magnets used
in traction is yet in the elementary phase. Currently only few vehicles rely on
induction electric motors (Tesla), whereby the magnetic field which turns the
rotor shaft is created using electrical current (Tesla Motor, 2014). It is the lat-
ter which makes the induction motors to be less efficient as compared to the
permanent magnet motors which rely on the magnetic fields created around
their respective magnets. Besides developing its own technology for induction
motor to be used in hybrids, Toyota Motor also currently uses Tesla’s induc-
tion motor within the RAV4 EV model (Ohnsman, 2011). Similarly, Renault is
using an externally excited synchronous motor in some of its models as deliv-
ered by Continental (Continental Corporation, 2011; Vignaud and Fennel, 2012).
Other car manufacturers are developing electric motors with reduced amounts
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of dysprosium, such as Nissan within Nissan Leaf and GM within Chevrolet
Volt (Renault Nissan, 2012; Redall and Gordon, 2012; Syrett, 2012). Finally,
Hitachi has been developing a prototype of a motor using amorphous metal for
iron cores and ferrite magnets as rotors (Hitachi Ltd, 2012), while Hybrid Elec-
tric Vehicle Technologies (HEVT) has patented switched reluctance motor which
eliminates use of rare earths by ferromagnetic instead of permanent magnet ro-
tor (Environment News Service, 2012). This technology however is claimed to
need more optimisation before being marketed. Also, several other projects are
on their way, such as the three financed by ARPA-E: Baldor Electric Company
developing rare earth free traction motor design with improved cooling system
(ARPA-E, 2014a); QM Power developing electric motor with use of iron-based
magnets and new motor control technique (ARPA-E, 2014c); and University of
Texas developing an electric motor with double stator design which is completely
rare earths free (ARPA-E, 2014e).
However, as discussed previously, also regular ICEV contain some quantities of
rare earths. Consequently, even if batteries and magnets in advanced technology
vehicles could be produced rare earths free, a substantial level of dependence on
rare earths in automotive industry would remain. While this remains a serious
issue in the coming years, it is expected that in the long run these can also be
replaced by other materials resulting from basic research initiatives as discussed
above.
5.3 Secondary Market
In his 2011 analysis of rare earths life cycles, Du and Graedel (2011) note that
one of the 5 points within material flows cycles where losses of rare earths oc-
cur is waste management. Hence, improving this stage of life cycle via efficient
recycling creates secondary market for rare earths, which in turn decreases de-
pendence of rare earths-importing countries on Chinese supplies. This would
furthermore lower environmental degradation from mining and also address the
balance problem (Binnemans et al., 2013). However, while commercial recycling
for base metals was developed long ago - lead being the most recycled metal
with rate of 80% - no large scale recycling of rare earths currently exists. In par-
ticular, it has been estimated that recycled content (RC) of lanthanum, cerium,
praseodymium, neodymium, gadolinium and dysprosium is in the range of 1-10%
and inferior to 1% for the rest of elements (Graedel et al., 2011).8 The global
end-of-life recycling rates (EOL-RR) are also less than 1% for all rare earth el-
ements, due to inefficiencies in collection and processing of discarded products.
Instead, no data is available for old scrap ratios (OSR). This can be explained by
long in-use lifetimes due to which wind turbines are only available for recycling
with a lag of 20 years. Such low levels of recycling imply that substantial quan-
tities that could be reused are lost. This is further confirmed by Goonan (2011)
8RC is 0% for yttrium, while no estimates are available for scandium.
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who illustrates distribution of rare earths from end uses in consumer products
to various modes of disposition. Close to no recovery of rare earths occurs for
catalysts and metallurgical alloys and to some small extent for coloured glass
and ceramics. While technology is available, at present separation of rare earths
proves costly. However, considering that stocks of rare earths exceed annual
extraction in 2007 four-fold, recycling definitely has a potential to offset part of
the primary materials mining (Du and Graedel, 2011). In this light, substantial
R&D has been directed to the area of chemical processing and re-use of material
recovered.
For what concerns magnetic materials, as opposed to SmCo magnets, reprocess-
ing NdFeB magnets is complicated in that corrosion of material requires refining.
Also, strong magnetic fields and nickel plating which protects magnets from hu-
mid environments make the recycling more complex. Finally, considering the
high content of iron which is disposed of as waste (2/3 as compared to 1/3 of
rare earths content), recycling of NdFeB magnets is economically not justified
(Binnemans et al., 2013; Goodier, 2005). Recycling routes, their respective ad-
vantages and disadvantages as well as current research on recovery of rare earths
are described in Binnemans et al. (2013); Schu¨ler et al. (2011). Pre-consumer re-
cycling concerns magnet production scrap which can amount to as much as 30%
of the alloy at the beginning of the manufacturing process and should be carried
out by magnet manufacturing companies. Post-consumer recycling is mostly tar-
geting NdFeB material present in electronic goods recovered from “urban mines”,
such as HDD, cell phones and air conditioners, and is becoming an established
practice in Japan (Baba et al., 2013; Hitachi Ltd, 2010; Tabuchi, 2010). Re-use
of magnets in current form and shape is deemed especially suitable for large
magnets in wind turbines and advanced technology vehicles, though it is rarely
made use of due to their long service lives. The authors also estimate the global
recycling potential for 2020 to lie between 3300 and 6600 tonnes of rare earths
for magnets, assuming global collection rate of 30-60%, recycling efficiency of
55% and an average lifetime for magnets in wind turbines of 15 years.
In case of NiMH batteries, these are made up of 8-10% of rare earths mischmetal,
the rest being constituted by nickel, cobalt, manganese and aluminium (Mu¨ller
and Friedrich, 2006). While until recently rare earths from batteries were lost to
the steel industry, nowadays hydrometallurgical and pyrometallurgical methods
are employed to recover these, as described within Mu¨ller and Friedrich (2006);
Binnemans et al. (2013); Schu¨ler et al. (2011). In case of NiMH batteries, Bin-
nemans et al. (2013) estimate a global recycling potential of 1000 to 1750 tonnes
by 2020, assuming the global collection rate to lie between 40 and 70%, with re-
cycling efficiency of 50%, with lifetime for batteries of 10 years. Toyota was the
first producer to recover rare earths by recycling NiMH batteries from end-of-life
HEV (Toyota, 2013). In 2013, Honda announced that it would be reusing raw
materials from recycled batteries (and various other used parts) to build new
ones (Honda, 2013). In Europe, Umicore claims to be the first to have built a
recycling facility to recycle NiMH, Li-ion and Li-polymer battery technologies
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in 2011 (Umicore, 2014). In the US, Retriev Technologies is the major recycler
of all types of batteries (Retriev Technologies, 2014). Since recycling of vehicle
batteries is a developing industry, there is no data available for it yet.
To conclude with, some of the main constraints to recycling as discussed above
could be solved by appropriate policy responses. For example, in Europe the fol-
lowing legal enforcement of waste collection, recycling of batteries and recovery
of vehicles and their components was enacted: Directive 2013/56/EC on Bat-
teries, Directive 2012/19/EU on Waste Electrical & Electronic Equipment and
Directive 2000/53/EC on End of Life Vehicles (EC, 2014a). Such policy mea-
sures, if efficiently implemented might help creating a secondary market for rare
earths within Europe and thus contribute to decreased dependence on supply
of primary material from China. Besides decreasing private costs, these policies
could also decrease social costs to mining by lowering environmental degradation,
as discussed in Section 7.
5.4 Stockpiling
As opposed to the above strategies, stockpiling is a short term measure which
serves as a buffer against interruptions in trade. This is especially true in the
period of crisis as defined by Nordhaus (1974), when storage acts like an alter-
native source of supply. This however only pays out if the price of rare earths
and their cost of storing do not exceed the marginal cost of developing reserve
capacity.
The EU has evaluated feasibility of economic stockpiling as a correction measure
in the short to medium term (EC and RPA, 2012). It also considered the form of
stockpiled material, claiming that while stockpiling of concentrates would give
end-users the possibility to tailor make their products, the EU does not posses
processing and refining capacity to cope with less processed rare earths at the
moment. Finally, due to high costs of up to 940 million Euros required to set up a
stockpile on the EU level, it was suggested to keep stockpiling on private level and
on voluntary bases. The US instead intends to build up national defence stockpile
(NDS) of rare earths to support defence production and essential civilian needs
in the context of congressionally mandated 4 year conflict scenario (DOD, 2013).
They however recommend a mix of mitigation strategies, stockpiling being the
last of these due to the relative high cost of federal inventories when compared
to other measures.
Several countries have such stockpiles in place already. Japan has established
stockpiling in 1983 to cope with short-term supply interruptions of 9 rare metals
and has recently started to investigate the possibility of a rare earths stock-
pile (DEFRA, 2012; JOGMEC, 2012; METI, 2011) (Kawamoto, 2008; Maeda,
2010). Besides the national stockpile, companies also keep their private reserves
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of rare earths (Topf, 2013b). Similarly, South Korea has established a stockpile
for strategically important elements, rare earths among others, to cover 60 days
of domestic demand, the level of reserves reaching 1’500 tonnes by 2014 (DE-
FRA, 2012) (Japan Metal Bulletin, 2010; Park, 2011). This is to cover both
economic and strategic purposes. Also China started to build up strategic re-
serves in 2011, aiming to purchase 100’000 tonnes of rare earths for national
storage. The estimated value of the purchase is almost USD 1 billion, targeting
mainly HREE and is aimed to protect rare earth resources and to establish a
secure and stable supply system (Areddy, 2011) (MIIT, 2012; MOFCOM, 2012g;
MOFCOM, 2012m; MLR, 2011). Nonetheless, the recent reserve accumulation
by China is also foreseen to act as a stabilisation mechanism in times of falling
prices (Currie, 2012; Topf, 2013a; Xinhua, 2012).
In conclusion, while stockpiling strategy could significantly mitigate supply short-
ages and price spikes in periods of disruption, it could by the same token ad-
versely affect prices and quantities of raw materials in periods of acquisition (EC
and RPA, 2012). Besides issues with administrative burden and efficiency with
public stockpile, as well as speculation and financial risk accompanying private
stockpile, this strategy is targeting short term disruptions and hence does not
address the potentially long term tight supply issue. Moreover, should manu-
facturers substitute away from rare earths, the stockpile might become quickly
obsolete (EC and RPA, 2012). Therefore, a combination of strategies discussed
should be pursued in order to curb supply dependence on imported rare earths.
This ultimately translates into building up the whole supply chain outside China.
6 Factors Influencing Prices of Rare Earths
From the above discussion it becomes clear that the major issue of rare earths
is the growing imbalance between increased demand and tighter supply. Figure
14 depicts demand and supply estimates for 2016. Of the five critical metals,
yttrium and terbium appear to be short of supply, while the forecasted demand
of neodymium, dysprosium and europium is only slightly inferior to the respec-
tive supply figures. However, with a further increase of demand for rare earth
magnets from low carbon technologies, high-tech and medical applications, the
former three will also turn into under-supplied. The more so, since China might
further tighten the supply of HREE. In this light, Kingsnorth (2013c) forecasts
that the non-Chinese HREE supply could cover as few as 10% of the global needs
in 2016.
This section examines demand and supply in combination with the Chinese in-
dustrial policies, in order to offer a complete picture on the driving forces behind
rare earths’ prices. Both demand and supply are largely inelastic. Since rare
earths are mined mostly as by-products, their mining decisions often depend on
those of main products. However, with the opening of Mountain Pass and Mount
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Figure 14: Global Demand and Supply Forecast for Individual Rare Earths, +/- 20%
(in tonnes), 2016.
Source: Adapted from Kingsnorth (2013c). Data are a courtesy of Professor Kingsnorth.
Weld for primary mining of rare earths, supply of LREE is expected to become
more price elastic. Demand in turn is inelastic due to the lack of substitutes
for rare earths with same or superior properties. This implies that tightening of
supply by China would drive prices up and trigger higher production costs for
technology applications which use rare earths as inputs. While prices alone are
not the only factor inducing innovation, they serve as an indicator of scarcity
in that they embed developments on the market. Hence, it proves important to
understand the historical price development of rare earths.
6.1 Rare Earths Price Trends
Figures 15a and 15b report historical price developments for the 2 groups of
rare earth oxides, respectively. Nominal pricing data was collected from various
sources and indexed to 100 in 1989 in order to allow for comparison of changes
over the period examined (1989-2013). Note that prices vary with quantity and
quality of oxides, as well as across producing companies. Due to the fact that
rare earths are not exchange traded, no official prices exists. Year-end prices are
recorded as reported by various suppliers or users based on long term contracts
(BGR, 2014; USGS, 2013). Daily time series instead, are calculated mid prices
by Datastream, 2014. Moreover, pricing data is not available historically for uni-
form purities, what caused some price jumps in historical trends for Samarium,
Terbium and Dysprosium between 1999 and 2000. Specific oxide purities taken
into consideration are declared within the Figure. Scandium oxide was excluded
due to the lack of sufficient historical pricing data available. Promethium was ex-
cluded due to its minor use. For comparison, indexed prices for gold and copper
as well as the Producer Price Index for Crude Materials for Further Processing
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(PPI Crude Raw Materials) as constructed by FRED, 2014 are plotted.
Looking at Figure 15 it becomes obvious that rare earth oxide prices were mixed
but fairly stable throughout the 1990s and the first five years of the 21st century.
Though majority have higher price changes than those of copper and gold, they
remain below the PPI Crude Raw Materials. Overall, prices for HREE tended
to be smoother in terms of spikes and also more correlated. In general, they
were also substantially higher than those of the LREE. Prices of lanthanum and
cerium increased in early 1990s due to the demand from automotive industry for
NiMH batteries and petroleum fluid cracking catalysts, and catalytic converters
and ultraviolet absorbing glass, respectively (USGS, 2013). Price for samarium
was on decrease due to the industry substituting away from SmCo to NdFeB
permanent magnets. Permanent magnets constituted the largest increase over
all alloys and metal uses. In line with this, price for neodymium was increasing
throughout the period (USGS, 2013). Dysprosium, terbium and praseodymium,
also used in production of these magnets, were slightly decreasing due to the
growing supply from China. Besides pushing down prices, competitive pricing
from Chinese producers also triggered a continuous decrease in the rest of the
world’s production of rare earths from 1991 onwards. With the shut down of
Molycorp and Russian mining operations in 2002 and 2003 , China gained a
monopoly and by 2005 it produced some 95% of global rare earths. In 2005 the
export VAT rebate was abolished by Chinese Government. After 2005, prices
and their variations were on increase for both HREE and LREE. This trend was
driven by increasing demand which originated predominantly from permanent
magnets and rechargeable batteries within automotive and electronics industries,
as well as from fibre optics and medical applications (USGS, 2013). It started
to increase substantially from 2006 onwards, with 20% increase within a single
year only - a significant part of it coming from China. Besides this, China also
introduced production and export quotas to cap the quantities produced and
exported. As illustrated by Figure 6, the latter have been decreasing since until
they reached the lowest levels in 2011. In 2007 China adopted export tariffs to
further limit the export of rare earths (Tse, 2011). These currently range from
15% to 25% (Metal-Pages, 2009) and lead to price discrimination by pricing
domestic and foreign firms differently. Table 6 provides a comparison between
domestic Chinese prices and Chinese prices FOB for the critical REO. As can
be seen the wedge between them was increasing from 2007 onwards, with FOB
prices being at times twice as high as domestic prices, even before transport and
storage costs are included. Though the latter have been increasing over times as
well, the gap has not been matched yet.
In 2008 prices remained stable, hampered by economic downturn and a stag-
nant market for most of rare earths oxides as well as for permanent magnets.
The latter decreased further in 2009 from 66’000 tonnes in the previous year to
58’000 tonnes (USGS, 2013). On the supply side, some of the Chinese produc-
ers started to halt their production. It was further tightened by the decision
to limit new mining permits, and further centralised by establishing the Inner
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Figure 15: Nominal Rare Earths Prices, Year-end Quoted in USD/kg, Index 1989 =
100.
(a) Light Rare Earths Prices, Index 1989 = 100.
(b) Heavy Rare Earths Prices, Index 1989 = 100.
Note: Year-end prices for respective oxides reported in different purities historically: 1989-1999: Dy, Nd
95%; Pr, Er, Sm 96%; Yb 99%, Ce 99.5%; Ho, Tb, Tm 99.9%; Eu, Gd, La, Lu, Y 99.99%; 2000-2009:
Dy 99%, Sm, Tb 99.99%, the rest remains same; in 2010 and 2011 changes with respect to preceding
year: Dy 96% and Sm 99.9%, and Dy 99.5%, respectively; 2012-2013: La, Y 99.999% and the rest
99.9%. Source: Own calculations based on data compiled from (BGR, 2014; Datastream, 2014; FRED,
2014; USGS, 2013).
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Table 6: Price Comparison of Selected Rare Earth Oxides, Average Yearly Prices
Quoted in USD/kg, on FOB China and China Domestic basis.
Y Oxide 99.999% Tb Oxide 99.9% Nd Oxide 99% Eu Oxide 99% Dy Oxide 99%
FOB* Domestic† FOB Domestic FOB Domestic FOB Domestic FOB Domestic
2005 N/A 5.28 311.19 300.99 7.34 7.38 278.08 267.55 41.38 41.43
2006 N/A 4.72 463.94 452.35 15.26 14.81 243.85 236.28 71.54 69.20
2007 N/A 6.39 582.57 517.61 29.85 26.25 314.54 279.45 88.20 78.24
2008 N/A 9.41 663.65 508.54 26.28 21.02 471.98 370.20 112.92 88.20
2009 N/A 6.28 361.09 253.82 14.83 12.29 475.06 362.99 107.55 85.25
2010 58.31 6.84 554.18 393.54 49.71 30.19 549.98 418.65 232.07 172.40
2011 141.82 42.48 2310.27 1674.42 248.39 136.23 2876.77 2137.80 1487.27 1070.21
2012 118.44 26.98 2037.78 964.69 124.23 77.03 2613.35 1240.29 1205.57 660.22
2013 25.74 12.34 925.86 602.10 72.09 51.80 1105.96 747.26 556.67 313.24
Q1/2014 20.96 10.07 788.73 554.18 69.81 51.07 925.91 727.72 465.36 294.02
*FOB China (Freight on Board), †China Domestic
Source: Own calculations based on data compiled from (Thomson Reuters Datastream Database,
2014).
Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Trading Company (USGS, 2013). Finally, in
2011 China started to crack down illegal mines and increased the resource tax
imposed on bastna¨site and monazite minerals 10-fold (Yuan, 2011). The same
year it started the stockpiling program which was to exercise further pressure
on demand of rare earths.
All these measures, combined with an increasing demand for rare earths, ad-
versely affected prices which were increasing exponentially through 2010 and
peaked in summer 2011. By far the largest increase since 1989 occurred for
neodymium (1250%) and dysprosium (1112%), followed by praseodymium, lan-
thanum, cerium and terbium with respective increases of roughly 480%, 330%,
290% and 210%. Hence, all four of the oxides currently used as inputs in perma-
nent magnets, as well as lanthanum used for production of NiMH batteries have
experienced exponential price increases. Contrary to this, the price of samarium
used for in the mean time niche product of SmCo permanent magnets, expe-
rienced a decrease by 30% since 1989. Similarly, the price of lutetium used in
small quantities in x-ray phosphors decreased by roughly 40%. For the rest of
rare earths examined, price increases were below 100% since 1989. Overall, fol-
lowing the definition of Nordhaus (1974), one can conclude that due to the sharp
increases in prices and to quantitative restrictions which held back substantial
supply from the market, rare earths market was in crisis. For comparison, within
the same period gold and copper prices were increasing by roughly 290% and
210%, while the PPI Crude Raw Materials increase by 140% between 1989 and
2011.
For a better overview of price developments, daily historical prices are reported in
Figure 16. Note that the data represents daily averages calculated by Thomson
Reuters Datastream Database (2014) which are rebased to 100 in 2003. Here it
can be seen that price hikes started in July-August 2010 and reached their peaks
in June-July 2011 when the speculative bubble burst. The variation in prices
measured as quarterly annualised volatilities is reported within Table 7. There
was a substantial volatility in Q3/2011 for each of the examined REO which
was further increasing in the first half of 2012 for the five critical REO. The
55
uncertainty about China tightening the supply even more lead to speculation.
Companies hoarding rare earths in view of higher profits and then disposing of
them triggered further price fluctuations.
Figure 16: Historical Prices for Selected Rare Earths Oxides, Daily, Index 12/12/2003
= 100, Average Quoted in USD/kg, on FOB China Basis.
Source: Own calculations based on compiled data from (Thomson Reuters Datastream Database, 2014).
Table 7: Annualised Quarterly Volatilities for Selected Rare Earth Oxides, Quarterly
Prices Quoted in USD/kg, on FOB China Basis.
Q3 2010 Q4 2010 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Q4 2011 Q1 2012 Q2 2012
Lanthanum 16.37% 374.47% 366.10% 343.28% 348.71% 143.07% 140.42% 59.82%
Cerium 20.36% 439.84% 425.33% 410.26% 412.68% 139.05% 135.20% 65.63%
Praseodymium 46.15% 61.51% 59.72% 88.99% 94.00% 108.49% 120.27% 43.22%
Neodymium 37.13% 63.97% 64.58% 97.58% 84.79% 122.07% 138.34% 73.88%
Samarium 1.47% 865.67% 840.27% 808.42% 803.10% 122.45% 117.11% 45.00%
Europium 7.62% 5.85% 3.60% 77.71% 285.42% 296.18% 303.59% 322.21%
Terbium 48.30% 44.48% 45.35% 84.52% 191.66% 204.88% 211.99% 222.02%
Dysprosium 44.82% 48.99% 45.72% 76.68% 199.73% 199.38% 218.60% 242.57%
Source: Own calculations based on data compiled from (Thomson Reuters Datastream Database,
2014).
Prices were on decrease till end of first half of 2013. On the one hand, this can
be attributed to the increased non-Chinese supply of primarily LREE coming
from Lynas which started mining in 2007 and processing in its Malaysia plant by
end of 2011, and from Molycorp which resumed mining late 2010 and processing
operations a year later. Coupled with this, export quotas have increased by some
3% from 2011 to 2012 and remained unchanged in 2013. On the other hand, the
global demand for rare earths decreased due to the economic downturn. This is
obvious from Figure 6, where export quotas remain unfilled for 2011 and 2012.
Also, compared to 1989, prices in 2013 increased by 267% for dysprosium, 252%
for neodymium and 215% for praseodymium. These increases by far outperform
price developments of both gold and copper as well as of the PPI Crude Raw
Materials with respective growths of 201%, 203% and 133%. However, most
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of the other rare earths prices have decreased compared to the 1989 levels, for
example lanthanum by 48% and cerium by 78%. In general it is expected that
price of LREE would further decrease due to additional supply from Lynas and
Molycorp, but at the same time prices for the critical REO to remain strong
in the short to medium term due to recovery of demand from major importing
countries and to increased demand from new technologies.
From the above it is safe to conclude that while price increases in the period of
2002-2008 were driven by increased demand from countries’ economic growth,
from 2005 onwards additional non-market forces in form of Chinese industrial
policies were distorting the rare earths market. Most significantly, it was the de-
creased production and export quotas which were feeding expectations of further
supply shortages. Speculation has driven up prices in excess of fundamentals,
especially in the period of crisis. While increased volatilities indicate risk, at the
same time they also signal opportunity to make profits. These were triggered by
lack of transparency due to missing spot and forward markets. In fact, in the
past trades used to be carried out based on long term contracts and prices set
by producers. Once prices started to become volatile, these were fixed to shorter
periods. Now, China has set up a trading platform and national pricing system
to exercise larger control over prices. Baotou Rare Earth Products Exchange
started trading end of March 2014 (Bloomberg News, 2014) and should bring
in more transparency into pricing by regulating supply and demand and setting
volatility under control. The question remains though, what are the implications
of such volatilities on producers of wind turbine and electrically powered vehicle
technologies.
6.2 Impact on Low Carbon Technologies’ Producers
Though China has been dominating the rare earths market since mid-1990s and
export and production quotas were in place already in early 2000s, the rare
earths problematic has only become a prominent topic in recent years. One
of the reasons for this are the small quantities of rare earths used in single
technologies, as well as the largely inelastic demand. Moreover, since rare earth
prices are rather low relative to the total cost of the final product, changes
in prices did not have substantial impact on producer costs. However, price
hikes like those in 2010-2011 brought significant uncertainty, which ultimately
put pressure on manufacturers and called innovation of rare earths intensive
technologies in question.
In this light, several experts confirm that further development of direct drives,
despite them being the superior technology on open sea, is threatened by pricing
and sourcing volatility of materials used as inputs in this technology (Bills and
Sison, 2013; Bo¨hmeke, 2013; So¨rensen, 2013). In fact, manufacturing costs of a
wind turbine are influenced primarily by the wind turbine itself, by the produc-
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tion environment where it is manufactured, by its production status achieved,
as well as by the cost of raw material used (Hau and Renouard, 2013). While
steel has the largest share of up to 85% of turbine’s total weight, the importance
of rare earths used for permanent magnets should not be neglected either. For
illustration, assuming a PMSG-DD with rated power of 2 MW, rotor diameter
82 m and hub height 80 m, and following the components cost breakdown as
specified by Hau and Renouard (2013), 80 USD/kg of required quantity of per-
manent magnet constitutes 23% of generator costs and 6% of total component
costs. Assuming a variation of prices of permanent magnet up to 420 USD/kg
during the rare earths crisis in 2011 (Polinder, 2011), this increases the share of
permanent magnet costs to almost 2/3 of the cost of generator and a quarter of
cost of all components. This in turn increases the cost per kW by 50% relative
to competing DFIG gearbox technology with same parameters (as compared to
only 7% when calculated with 80 USD/kg). Certainly, lower costs for mainte-
nance and repair in case of PMSG-DD design contribute to better economics
in the long run and balance higher production costs to some extent. However,
uncertainty about high and volatile prices and threat of supply disruption of rare
earths is inducing producers to adjust the designs of their drivetrains. In fact,
high investment costs might turn rare earths-intensive machines very expensive
and counterproductive in pushing down the cost of energy. Offshore wind energy
must become cheaper to compete with onshore wind and with other renewable
energies.
For what concerns raw material costs in advance technology vehicles, according
to the component cost comparison carried out by Burwell et al. (2013), the cost
of a 50 kW permanent magnet electric motor is by 30% - 200% higher than that
of a 50 kW copper rotor induction motor, depending on the pricing of rare earth
magnets. From manufacturer’s point of view, this implies that switching to the
latter technology would decrease total vehicle costs (even when considering the
need for increased battery size) and eliminate the dependence on rare earths. In
terms of batteries, these constitute the most expensive part of electric vehicles
- ranging from a third to over a half of HEV’s component cost. Of the battery
costs, almost 60% are material costs related to cell packs (Bitsche and Gutmann,
2004). For comparison, Li-ion batteries, despite their higher production costs
than NiMH batteries, are cheaper in terms of materials used (Toyota, 2010).
The cost of rare earths used within a NiMH battery, when converted into rare
earths mischmetal composed of 63.0 wt.% La, 17.4 wt.% Ce, 10.7 wt.% Pr, 2.2
wt.% Nd and 6.7% others (Lee et al., 2000), using the daily prices for rare earth
metals FOB China as provided by Datastream, 2014, increased substantially
from 21 USD on 30/12/2005 to 121 USD on 18/03/2014 - an increase by almost
500% overtime. Considering metal prices as of end of June 2011 when rare
earths crises peaked, the cost of total rare earth content was 707 USD - a 3300%
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increase when compared to 2005.9 Nonetheless, during the time of higher prices
producers presumably use up their private stocks so as to mitigate temporary
price hikes.
To conclude with, besides the uncertainty of availability of supply, increasing
prices of rare earths are also critical to their usage in both wind turbines and
advanced technology vehicles. In fact, this price volatility causes the attention
of manufacturers to shift away from technologies containing rare earths and ulti-
mately renders innovation in these economically non-viable. In face of increasing
demand for these, it might follow that manufacturers, and thus all their innova-
tion activities, relocate to China with view of sourcing cheaper inputs at stable
supply. It remains to be seen whether some of the industrial policies will be
abolished following the recent resolution on the WTO dispute.
7 Social Costs of Rare Earths
Besides private costs of rare earths in terms of price volatility and availability
uncertainty, there is also a social cost to mining rare earth minerals containing
radioactive thorium and uranium. This manifests itself in form of externalities to
environment and health. In fact, while China has been supplying almost the en-
tire world with rare earths during the past 20 years, the costs to environmental
degradation and health of local communities have been born entirely domes-
tically. In his famous quote, Wen Jiabao acknowledges that rare earths were
under-priced: “In the beginning of the 1980s, we sold rare earths at the price
of salt. But they deserve the price of gold. We are just starting to protect our
natural interests” (Hayes-Labruto et al., 2013). Having said this, it would seem
justifiable for importing countries to pay a surplus on their imports in order to
compensate for negative externalities caused by pollution. This section discusses
the social costs to the extensive use of primary production of rare earths.
7.1 The “Dirty” Clean Energy
According to the Chinese Society of Rare Earths and Materials Department of
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (as cited in Hurst, 2010),
up to 12’000 cubic meters of waste gas, 75 cubic meters of acidic waste wa-
ter, as well as one tonne of radioactive waste residue and 2’000 tonnes of mine
tailings containing thorium are emitted for each tonne of rare earths produced.
9Note that the cost or rare earths within NiMH changes in function of the composition
of mischmetal. For example, Shukla et al. (2001) assumes a cerium-rich mischmetal with the
following composition: 25 wt.% La, 50 wt.% Ce, 7 wt.% Pr, 18 wt.% Nd. Based on this the total
cost of rare earths would amount to 159 USD and 918 USD for 30/12/2005 and 30/06/2011,
respectively.
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With 2013 Chinese production levels, these amount to 100’000 tonnes of ra-
dioactive waste and 200 million tonnes of tailing per year. Discharged into
river without any treatment, these poison the water used for irrigation of farm
lands and have catastrophic effects on lives of both local residents, fauna and
flora. The severity Baotou production facility dumping waste to the Yellow river
was reported by several independent Chinese information sources as well as by
foreign newspapers (Bradsher, 2013; Guardian, 2012; Hui-juan, 2011; NTDTV,
2013b,a,c). China itself has acknowledged that rare earths mining deteriorates
its environment through processing of rare earths (MIIT, 2012) and in the broad
sense of environmental protection, the Government has been enacting laws since
1980s on environmental protection, water pollution, land reclamation, pollutant
discharge standards, as well as laws on prevention and control of radioactive
pollution (MIIT, 2012) (National People’s Congress, 2011). The National 12th
Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection also aims at reducing the discharge
of major pollutants by 40% (MEP, 2012). However, while environmental poli-
cies are picking up, these are not expected to reach the stringency of policies in
developed countries. In the particular case of rare earths, examining the criteria
rare earths producers must fulfil in order to have production quotas allocated to
them (MOFCOM, 2012a) hints on China’s genuine concern over environmental
pollution. Admittedly though, these measures provide an incentive rather than
an imperative to adhere to environmental standards (Liu and Maughan, 2012).
Other examples of precautionary action taken in light of environmental degra-
dation caused by extraction and processing of minerals containing radioactive
elements exist in developed countries. France in its la Rochelle rare earths pro-
cessing plant, decided to switch the feed materials to a thorium-free rare-earth
chloride due to concerns about radioactive thorium as a by-product of monazite
(Hedrick, 1994). Furthermore, Molycorp in the US was shut down in 2002, after a
series of waste water leakages from to the Mojave desert, containing heavy metals
and radioactive material (Nystrom, 2003). Lynas instead, mines rare earth ores
in Mount Weld mines in Australia, however outsources the processing of concen-
trates to Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) in Kuatan, Malaysia. Here,
wastes from the process are also disposed of, supposedly due to Malaysia’s lower
environmental standards. After all this would not be the first case of pollution
export by developed countries relocating industrial production to a developing
country. An analogy to this case is the Asia Rare Earth (ARE), the main share-
holder of which (Mitsubishi Chemicals) despite of its established know-how in
handling of radioactive materials has relocated the rare earths processing indus-
try in 1979 from Japan, a country with stringent environmental regulation to
Bukit Merah, Malaysia. While products were shipped back to Japan, the ra-
dioactive waste remained in Malaysia. It was decided by the Government that
thorium was supposed to be stored as a potential nuclear fuel for the future,
though the factory was operating without a proper waste disposal system and a
permanent dump site in early years, and was seen using a dubious process of rare
earths extraction and neglecting all safety standards (Consumers Association of
Penang, 1993).
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Despite this evidence, the rest of the world tends to devalue the environmental
motivations of China in setting export and production quotas. Certainly, China’s
intention to promote industrial upgrading by using rare earths to manufacture
technologically advanced products is undeniable. Nonetheless, there is no reason
to question the justifiability of its environmental claims. Also, keeping in mind
the environmental implications of mining and processing rare earths, there is
quite some irony in using ‘dirty’ rare earths in ‘clean’ technologies. All in all,
unless sustainable model of extraction and process is introduced which would
reflect efficient and environmentally friendly approach to mining, rare earths
do not live up to their denomination of ‘green elements’. Even switching to
underwater extraction of deposits at seabed of Pacific Ocean, concerns prevail
that rare earths mining might destroy the respective ecosystem (Arte, 2013).
Finally, the race for new mining sites to come online in shortest delays due to
the pressing demand of rare earths might come at the expense of upholding
environmental standards, especially in developing countries.
7.2 Health Issues
Documentation on rare earth mining-caused illnesses is rather scarce globally.
At present there is exists only one account, namely the one of Malaysian Bukit
Merah and its inhabitants documented by Consumers Association of Penang
(1993). This book collects testimonies of inhabitants on both children and adults
falling sick, on death cases due to leukaemia and brain cancer, as well as on
cases of newborns with congenital defects and on mothers suffering from higher
miscarriage rate. The health situation has also been documented scientifically
by Bertell (1993), who compared the monocyte depression across populations
of children exposed to bone-seeking radionuclides. Children from Bukit Merah
constituted one of the samples exposed to thorium hydroxide and lead sulphate
waste from ARE and were compared a sample of children from Carey Island
- exposed to palm oil, pesticides and herbicides eﬄuences, but no radioactive
gases. From the two testing periods in 1987 and 1988 the study concludes a shift
towards lower monocyte counts for children with longer exposure, with more
than half of the children tested in the second period having counts of below
the normal range. Children from Carey Island instead, though having a similar
socio-economic and lower nutritional status, demonstrated superior health. This
study confirmed that the increased levels of lead in Bukit Merah children’s blood
was to be attributed to ARE plant, lead being a marker of thorium hydroxide
presence in blood. Indeed, ARE was extracting rare earth from monazite, which
is known to contain radionuclides in uranium and thorium decay series, as well
as lead. These are being released from ores when crushed and ground and decay
into radioactive radon airborne in dust. Furthermore, after rare earth chloride is
separated from monazite, thorium hydroxide cake or sludge is left behind. These
in turn produce alpha radiation, which when exposed to, cause cancer (Bertell,
1993) (IAEA, 2011). It is a well known fact that radiation lowers the white
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blood cells in the bone marrow and thus destroys the immune system which in
turns lowers the resistance to disease. Taking into consideration the Malaysian
statistics on leukaemia in 1986, with 3 cases diagnosed in 6 months time, the
Bukit Meran incidence was some 180 times higher than Malaysia wide incidence.
For what concerns China, in its report on rare earth industry (MIIT, 2012) the
Government acknowledges damage to peoples’ safety and health. Unfortunately,
there are no official health statistics from Baotou, the world capital of rare earths
production, accessible to underpin the extent of this damage. However, according
to the Chinese Cancer Map revealed by the journalist Deng Fei and translated in
O’Donnell (2013), Baotou is one of the “cancer villages” with a cancer death ratio
of more than 70% of all deaths in 2006. This high cancer rate is claimed to be
caused by bad water quality due to the presence of heavy metals and radioactive
materials. The contamination of the soil in the vicinity of treatment, storage and
disposal areas as well as the doses of airborne radionuclides on workers exposed to
mining and beneficiation facilities in this region are summarised in IAEA, 2011.
In this respect, it is not surprising that China is one of the countries hardest
hit by cancer, with 21% of newly diagnosed cancer cases of global total, with
the risk of getting cancer before reaching age of 75 being 17%, according to the
World Cancer Report (as cited in Jing, 2014) and the IARC GlobalCan (as cited
in Cancer Index, 2013). Another 6 out of 8 provinces with rare earths processing
appear on this map as well: Shandong, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan and
Yunnan. Ultimately, the Chinese Government has acknowledged the existence
of cancer villages, the long term harm to environment and human health arising
from poisonous chemical products emitted, among others, by non-ferrous metal
smelting and processing which include rare earths (Briefing, 2013).
8 Conclusions: Separating Myth from Reality
The aim of this paper was to shed clarity on the far reaching consequences of
rare earths demand-supply imbalances on innovation of low carbon technologies.
It provided a thorough overview of market forces in place, investigating the main
drivers of demand and supply, as well as the industrial policies distorting the
rare earths market. Furthermore, the paper discussed private and social costs to
using rare earths in low carbon technologies and reviewed mitigation strategies
which could help reducing rare earths dependence for the future.
On the supply side, the existence of a supply risk was confirmed. Rather than
from physical scarcity, this arises from institutional inefficiency within the mar-
ket. China is currently the largest global producer with a market share of 89%
and also possesses single largest reserves of rare earths. However, as opposed
to the common belief, concentration per se is not the main driver of supply dis-
ruption. Instead, it is China’s abuse of market power as a means of political
instrument to achieve its economic targets. In fact, China has been holding a
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monopoly on rare earths during the past 20 years, but only recently it started
to significantly tighten their supply. In line with its resource nationalism, China
introduced several industrial policies to satisfy own needs of rare earths for man-
ufacturing higher valued added products. Restrictions such as introduction of
production and export quotas, as well as banning of foreign companies from en-
gaging in the supply chain within China, are holding back rare earths supply
from the global market. While both export and production quotas have been
continuously decreasing, the former remained largely unfilled in 2011 and 2012.
Though the situation is expected to reverse in the short term, it is the decrease
in production quotas which ultimately tightens both international and Chinese
supply. Moreover, not the cumulative quotas, but the limitation these impose on
the production and export of more scarce HREE, are the main threat to disrup-
tion. Coupled with other measures of intentional supply disruptions, such as the
national pricing system and double pricing practices, these protectionist poli-
cies favour China’s national interests of industrial upgrading and substantially
distort the market.
The rest of the world responded to these threats by diversification of supply.
From long term perspective, opening new mines will assure new supply of rare
earths. However, due to various political, economic, financial and environmental
obstacles, most of the mines are expected to start producing with a delay of
up to 10 years, if at all. However, while overall reserves of rare earths seem to
be distributed evenly across the globe, 80% of continental HREE deposits are
concentrated in ionic clays of China. This implies that even if non-Chinese rare
earths projects brought LREE supply back to balance, HREE will remain critical
going forward. In this respect, mining from Pacific Ocean seabed might become
an alternative in the long term, though at the same time a source of geopoliti-
cal tensions in East Asia. Short term strategies for diversifying supply are raw
materials diplomacy on country level and strategic alliances across supply chain
on company level. Though these might solve potential short term supply short-
ages of LREE, no immediate alternatives to mitigate HREE supply disruptions
exist outside China. In such cases, stockpiling might serve as a backup resource
in times of crisis. Finally, establishing recycling, as a secondary source of rare
earths might deliver results in medium term.
The demand for rare earths is driven primarily by permanent magnets used in
low carbon technologies, in consumer electronics as well as in medical applica-
tions. This paper has examined the role of rare earths in the specific context of
offshore wind turbines and advanced technology vehicles. The results disprove
the widespread allegation that availability risk of rare earths impedes deploy-
ment of offshore wind per se. Contrary to this, the deployment of permanent
magnet technology in particular - the superior technology on the open sea due
to its reliability and efficiency - might become prone to supply risk, depending
on its future market share and level of hybridisation adopted. This topology
is characterised by its high rare earths intensity. However, while its share of
total capacity produced is currently growing at a rate of 600% - outpacing by
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far the growth of traditional geared drives - its share of annual global supply
of neodymium and dysprosium in particular, is negligible. Despite the inelastic
demand for rare earths, it is foreseeable that in case of substantial pricing or
sourcing volatility, manufacturers might switch to alternative technologies in or-
der to keep offshore wind energy competitive. The more so, since currently there
exist no substitutes for rare earths within permanent magnets. While various
R&D initiatives have been undertaken in the direction of minimisation through
nanocomposite magnets, and of replacement by cheaper and more abundant ma-
terials, this research is not expected to yield commercially deployable results any
time soon.
The automotive market and its electrification instead, are substantially depen-
dent on availability of rare earths. A typical electrically powered vehicle requires
up to 4.1 kg of rare earths for its electric traction drive, and in function of the
energy model, also for the battery. Besides these, every energy model, including
the conventional ICEV, contains up to 0.44 kg of rare earths scattered across var-
ious parts. Despite the seemingly small quantities, the latter alone would require
approximately 70% and 120% of neodymium and dysprosium supply forecasted
for 2014, while respective shares would increase to 80% and 210% considering
tighter supply estimated for 2016. While, the current share of electrically pow-
ered vehicles in total rare earths demand is substantially smaller, this is expected
to increase in the future with their growing deployment. Therefore a potential
supply shortage would disrupt the further development of the market altogether.
While there is a substantial uncertainty in deployment trends of energy models
and of their charging infrastructures, price decreases envisaged for Li-ion battery
packs and potential price volatilities and availability risk of rare earths might
speed up the paradigm shift towards the former.
In summary, uncertainty about volatile prices and threat of supply shortages
induce manufacturers to shift away from technologies containing rare earths, and
ultimately render innovation in the latter economically non-viable. In the face
of increasing demand for these, it might follow that manufacturers, and thus all
their innovation activities, relocate to China with view of sourcing cheaper inputs
at stable supply. Keeping in mind the slow pace of increase of primary supply
outside China and the low efficiency of recycling, it becomes imperative for policy
makers to design policies in order to avoid getting the world “trapped” in the
rare earths dependence. In this light, more concerted action in research should
be directed towards R&D on material substitution within permanent magnets,
on increasing efficiency in use of the latter and on developing sustainable mining
and processing techniques - especially for handling toxic wastes safely. The
latter also proves important with regards to high social costs of mining in form
of externalities to environment and people’s health. Finally, technical skills and
manufacturing capabilities in rare earths processing need to be re-built in order
to close the gap between China and the Western countries and to put the latter
back on the map of global players.
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A Appendix
Table 8: Data on Chinese Rare Earths Production and Exports, and Respective Quo-
tas, in tonnes, 2003-2013.
Year Production Production Quota Exports Exports Quota
2003 92’000 NA 73’522 47’059
2004 98’000 NA 69’713 52’941
2005 119’000 NA 65’207 65’580
2006 133’000 86’620 66’410 61’070
2007 120’000 87’020 54’353 59’643
2008 125’000 87’620 54’986 49’990
2009 129’000 82’320 43’918 48’155
2010 120’000 89’200 39’813 30’258
2011 105’000 93’800 16’861 30’184
2012 100’000 93’800 16’265 30’996
2013 100’000 93’800 NA 30’999
Note: Production quotas for 2003-2005 are unknown. For 2012 there was no production quota
announced, therefore assumed unchanged. Data according to MLR (aligned with MIIT from 2010
onwards) reported annually, set for HREE and LREE separately. Exports are estimates and do not
contain illegal mined quantities. Export data not published yet. Export quota figures before 2005
recalculated into REO, since officially published in gross weight. They are summed across semi-
annual allocations to both Chinese companies and foreign joint ventures. Since 2012 MOFCOM
reports allocations for HREE and LREE separately. Source: Based on data collected from UN
Statistics Division, 2013; MOFCOM, 2014; USGS, 2013; USGS, 2014 Tse (2011).
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Table 9: Advanced Rare Earth Projects Outside China, by company.
Company Name Project Name Country
Alkane Resources Dubbo Zirconia Project Australia
Arafura Resources Nolans Australia
Avalon Rare Metals Nechalacho Upper Canada
Avalon Rare Metals Nechalacho Basal Canada
Commerce Resources Ashram Main Canada
Commerce Resources Ashram MHREO Canada
Frontier Rare Earths Zandkopsdrift South Africa
Great Western Minerals Group Hoidas Lake Canada
Great Western Minerals Group Steenkampskraal South Africa
Greenland Minerals and Energy Kvanefjeld Greenland
Greenland Minerals and Energy Sørensen Greenland
Greenland Minerals and Energy Zone 3 Greenland
Hudson Resources Sarfartoq Greenland
Lynas Corporation Mount Weld CLD Australia
Lynas Corporation Mount Weld Duncan Australia
Lynas Corporation Kangankunde Malawi
Matamec Explorations Kipawa Canada
Molycorp Mountain Pass USA
Navigator Resources Cummins Range Australia
Pele Mountain Resources Eco Ridge Canada
Quest Rare Minerals Strange Lake Granite Canada
Quest Rare Minerals Strange Lake Enriched Canada
Rare Element Resources Bear Lodge USA
Stans Energy Kutessay II Kyrgyzstan
Tasman Metals Norra Ka¨rr Sweden
Tasman Metals Olserum Sweden
Ucore Rare Metals Bokan USA
Source: Adapted from Hatch (2014, 2011b).
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